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Abstract 
The Purpose of this study was to determine what affects, if any exist, crude oil and natural 
gas supply and demand has on the international relations of Northeast Asia.  This was done 
by answering the research question: does the need to for energy security override the desire to 
maintain the status quo regarding national policy toward controversial issues facing Northeast 
Asia. 
The study uses the territorial dispute over the maritime boundary between China and Japan in 
the East China Sea, the controversies of the Sakhalin oil and gas development projects and 
the East Siberia Pipeline in the Russian Far East, and the nuclear crisis on the Korean 
Peninsula as case studies for analysis. 
By statistically correlating empirical data on crude oil and natural gas pricing, consumption, 
and production to quantitative data derived from qualitative data regarding the chosen case 
studies by use of an original framework, the study finds that there is no conclusive 
relationship to support a statistical connection.  The study also uses qualitative analysis 
compare the empirical data on crude oil and natural gas pricing, consumption, and production 
to qualitative data regarding the chosen case studies and finds that there likely are some 
correlations between them, but that they are not a driving force for political policy regarding 
the chosen cases. 
 
Related keywords: energy security, conflicts, crude oil, natural gas, Northeast Asia. 
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Abbreviations 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
CV Conflict Value 
DPRK Peoples Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
ECS East China Sea 
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
NEA Northeast Asia
1
 
PRC Peoples Republic of China (China) 
RFE Russian Far East
2
 
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea) 
UA Reliable Data Unavailable
3
 
US United States of America 
USD US dollars 
USSR United Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
4
 
  
                                                          
1
 Northeast Asia refers to the geographically defined area of the Russian Far East, North Korea, South Korea, 
China, and Japan. 
2
 The Russian Far East refers to the area of Russia boarding the Pacific Ocean and Eastern Siberia. 
3
The abbreviation UA is found in the tables in the Appendix, and indicates that reliable data for the given item is 
unavailable.  
4
 All Russian oil and gas data prior to 1985 actually refers to that of the Soviet Union.  Furthermore all Russian 
actions prior to the dissolving of the USSR also refer to actions under taken by the Soviet Union. 
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1 Introduction 
With the global recession, energy prices have fallen radically (United States Energy 
Information Administration, 2009).  Even the Iraq war which was the main driving force for 
the skyrocketing price of crude oil in 2008 (Flint, 2008) seems to play a lesser role than it did 
just one year ago.  However, with OPEC‘s claim that they are intent on maintaining a crude 
oil price of 60 USD/barrel (Hoyas, 2006) we can be sure that costs will go back up. 
What this means for NEA is that as one of the world‘s largest consumer regions of crude oil, 
surpassing even the EU 15, it finds itself in an unstable and unsecure situation regarding 
energy dependence.  This is particularly true considering that the primary supplier for NEA, 
with the exception of Russia, is the Middle East (Kanekiyo, 2004a).  While China relies on 
crude oil for only 25 percent of its energy needs (Kanekiyo, 2004b), giving it some added 
elasticity, the sheer size of its growing economy means that it is now the world‘s second 
largest consumer of crude oil (Lai, 2007; United States Energy Information Administration, 
2009).  Because much of the increased demand in the PRC is due increased demand in the 
transportation sector for use in automobiles, the rising need for oil is unlikely to change; 
transportation being where oil as a source of energy is virtually irreplaceable (Lai, 2007).  
Japan and South Korea also rely heavily on crude oil for energy dependence, roughly 50 
percent of energy supply in both countries (Kanekiyo, 2004b), with neither nation having any 
real domestic production to speak of (BP, 2008a). 
Natural gas also plays a significant role in NEA energy supply (Fujime, 2002).  Japan‘s 
attempts to limit its reliance on crude oil have led to an increased use of natural gas (Koike, 
2006; Oil & Gas Journal, 2005), and the ROK is also a major consumer (Fujime, 2002).  In 
NEA natural gas is most often consumed in the form of LNG (Nicholls, 2003), with non-
liquefied natural gas accounting for only around ten percent of trade.  Together the ROK and 
Japan make up 70 percent of the global demand for LNG (Gavin & Lee, 2007).  China is now 
a net exporter of natural gas (BP, 2008a); projects in the ECS and other areas helping them 
surpass their domestic demand. 
Energy also plays a significant role in the nuclear proliferation of the Korean Peninsula.  One 
of the demands that the DPRK has consistently made is for energy assistance in return for 
suspension of its nuclear program (Brooke, 2004; Watkins, 2007a).  Indeed, one of the key 
items in the 1994 agreement that suspended the North Korean nuclear programs was the 
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promise to build 2 light water reactors to provide energy to North Korea; the delays, excuses 
and inaction of the US to live up to the agreement is one of the primary reasons they gave for 
recommencing their programs (Brooke, 2004; Watkins, 2007a). 
The obvious solution to supplying the massive energy needs of NEA is the development of 
Russia‘s oil and gas deposits in Siberia and the RFE (Brooke, 2004; Kangas, 2007; The 
Economist, 2009).  Many authors laud the implications that such agreements could have, but 
recent events such as Gazprom‘s hostile takeover of Sakhalin II (Turkeltaub & Bailey, 2007), 
have shown the dangers of relying on Russian Oil and Gas. 
Gavin and Lee (2007) put forward that building a regional framework similar to that of 
Europe‘s Energy Charter Treaty could give China, Japan and South Korea enough leverage to 
deal with Russia on an even field.  However there are stark differences though, in the supply 
logistics and structure on the European and Asian sides of Russia (Gavin & Lee, 2007).  
Therefore caution must be used when trying to apply any of the European lessons to the 
situation in NEA. 
 
2 Purpose of the Study and Research Questions 
The main purpose of this study is to understand the current international conflict environment 
in NEA as it relates to the oil and gas industry.  In order to fulfill this purpose the study asks 
whether the countries of NEA more likely to take a cooperative or an uncooperative stance on 
disputes involving their neighbors when the supply of crude oil and/or natural gas is scarce 
(as represented by higher prices) and in high demand (as represented by the amount imported 
by a particular nation). 
Put in a different way, this study asks whether the need to for energy security overrides the 
desire to maintain the status quo regarding national policy toward controversial issues facing 
NEA.  The study uses the territorial dispute over the maritime boundary between China and 
Japan in the ECS, the controversies of the Sakhalin oil and gas development projects and the 
East Siberia Pipeline in the RFE, and the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. 
The reasons behind the selection of these topics are numerous; suffice to say that personal 
interests in NEA, peace and conflict studies, and energy security play a key role.  The hope is 
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also that an analysis of the impacts of oil and gas consumption, pricing and demand on the 
conflicts of NEA can at the very least further the understanding of the intricacies at work, and 
help in finding resolutions to the conflicts. 
Because of the unique nature of each dispute, individual sub-questions are necessary in order 
to apply their unique lessons to NEA conflicts as a whole.  In the case of the ECS territorial 
dispute the main question is to what extent the domestic demands for oil and gas in the PRC 
and in Japan has affected this dispute. 
The controversies surrounding the RFE crude oil and natural gas projects imply that the 
Russian government is more likely to play hard ball and pit the buyers against each other 
when demand for Russian oil and/or gas is high, and also that they are more willing to risk 
losing cooperation for overseas investors (particularly in Japan and the PRC) in the same 
circumstances; this is the first question the study attempts to answer in regards to this dispute.  
A further question is whether the desire for Russian control of these projects is at all 
influenced by the prices of oil and gas, Russian energy needs, or the value or quantity of 
Russian exports. 
Regarding the Korean nuclear crisis the primary question to answer is whether crude oil 
prices and/or gas prices are a factor in the DPRKs stance and their willingness to negotiate, or 
in the willingness of others to negotiate. 
 
3 Delimitation 
3.1 Selection of Conflicts 
In order to fulfill the study‘s purpose and answer whether there is any correlation between 
hydrocarbon consumption and pricing, it is important to decide which conflicts to take into 
account.  NEA has no small number of disputes (Lai, 2007), so selecting which ones to 
analyze must be given some thought. 
The first conflict that this study will examine is the territorial dispute between Japan and the 
Peoples Republic of China in the East China Sea.  This conflict is very appropriate as the 
territorial claims made by Japan and the PRC are motivated by the rich oil and gas reserves 
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found in the area (Koike, 2006).  Furthermore this dispute has been a major international 
standoff between two of the most powerful nations in the region for many years. 
The second area of examination are the large-scale RFE oil and gas projects where large 
investments have been made and/or promised by governments and/or corporations of NEA.  
Among these are included the Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II oil and gas projects and the East 
Siberia Pipeline.  These projects are of great importance to NEA relations, as they are 
development projects, undisputed in Russian ownership of the territory, but sometimes 
controversial in the approaches the Russian government has taken in developing them. 
The final conflict this study analyzes is the Korean nuclear issue, i.e. the continued research 
and expansion of nuclear capabilities in the DPRK.  Just as energy security is still of vital 
concern for the DPRK, it can be seen as one of the major issues involved in the dispute.  
Indeed, nearly every agreement that has been made, where the North Koreans agreed to 
suspend research, or shut down the nuclear facilities has involved some form of energy trade-
off, be it the building of light water reactors, or the supply of crude oil and heating oil 
(Rozman, 2007; Watkins, 2007a). 
3.2 Defining Northeast Asia 
For the purpose of this study the thesis poses that NEA is made up of The Russian Federation, 
The People‘s Democratic Republic of Korea, The Republic of Korea, The Peoples Republic 
of China and Japan.  Mongolia is left out because of its lack of inclusiveness in regard to the 
particular disputes chosen, and its less conspicuous involvement in most disputes of the 
region.  Though the US is highly involved in the region (Kim & Jones, 2007; Kim S. S., 
2004; Rozman, 2007), it is also left out since it is not only geographically located elsewhere, 
but since it is also neither a primary consumer of NEA energy, nor a primary energy provider 
to the region. The Republic of China (Taiwan) is also omitted, in order to avoid opening the 
can of worms it represents in terms of Chinese sovereignty particularly in regards to the ECS. 
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4 Theoretical Framework 
4.1 The Role Crude Oil and Natural Gas in Conflicts 
According to Ross (2008) the number of internal conflicts occurring worldwide has dropped 
significantly since the fall of the Soviet Union.  The ongoing number of major civil wars is 
less than a third of its previous value, and smaller scale conflicts have also decreased, albeit 
less drastically.  Of these he claims that one third occurs in oil rich countries, and that a 
domestic oil supply tends to intensify the conflicts, even more so than do diamonds or other 
natural resources. 
Lujala‘s (2009, p. 51) findings agree with this.  Indeed her research correlating levels of 
violence to natural resource extraction has found that ―Hydrocarbon production inside the 
conflict zone more than doubles the number of battle-related deaths.‖  This can be partly 
explained in that the conflicts tend to last longer, however an extended duration of conflict 
can also be seen as an indicator of the severity to which it affects those involved.  A hundred 
years war is likely to have a greater impact on a society, even if it is no more violent from 
year to year. 
Interestingly enough Lujala (2009, p. 51) also finds that ―the results show that hydrocarbon 
production outside the conflict zone, including offshore areas, is related to fewer combat 
deaths and less intensive conflicts.‖  Thus when she looks at all nations as a whole she finds 
that oil and gas production has no quantifiable effect on the severity of conflicts (Lujala, 
2009).  Presumably Ross is using a different framework for determining conflict severity in 
oil rich countries, wherein lies the discrepancy. 
Unlike Lujala, Ross (2008) also looks at the likelihood of a conflict developing within a 
given country and finds that oil rich developing nations are twice as likely to develop internal 
conflicts as those who have no oil resources.  That doesn‘t mean that all nations rich in oil are 
likely to evolve conflict, just that developing countries which have oil are more likely to 
become involved in domestic turmoil than those which do not. 
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4.2 Why Crude Oil and Natural Gas Fuel Conflicts 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of Ross‘s (2008) research is that he contextualizes his 
findings to identify three predominant reasons why oil production can make such a strong 
negative impact. 
Oil, Ross (2008) claims, can create economic instability such as the Dutch disease, where oil 
exports drive up the value of the nation‘s currency, devaluing other important exports such as 
agriculture and manufacturing, leaving the nation‘s economy tied to the market forces that 
determine the price of oil.  As an example he lists Nigeria where 1970s oil boom so devalued 
the nation‘s agricultural sector that the economy is still suffering from its effects today.  In 
addition, oil wealth leads also to an increased level of corruption within the nation‘s 
government; here Russia is specifically mentioned as a nation suffering from these effects. 
In the case of domestic production, presumably production within the conflict zone if we are 
to trust Lujala‘s findings, oil can be a major source of funding for insurgents and rebel groups 
(Ross, 2008).  Even if the national government is in control of the production, Ross (2008) 
asserts that the insurgents and rebels can either steal and sell large volumes of the production, 
as in the case of the Sudan, or make deals with outside groups for funding in return for 
promises of preferential consideration once they have seized control, as in the case of 
Equatorial Guinea. 
Even if the insurgents and rebels are unable to gain monetary value from the production of oil 
Ross (2008) shows that it can still create greater local support either though economic 
disparities that accompany its extraction, often through increased nationalist sentiment, 
whereby the local populace seeks autonomy in order to rectify these imbalances. 
4.3 Crude Oil and Natural Gas Fueling Conflicts in Northeast Asia 
At first glance most of these concerns do not seem to apply to NEA, presumably because of 
the remoteness of oil and gas production.  As Lujala (2009) has shown, offshore hydrocarbon 
production decreases, rather than increases the volatility of an internal conflict.  
Contextualizing her framework in reference to the ECS conflict however, we see that the oil 
and gas reserves are located offshore; indeed they are at the heart of the territorial dispute 
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between Japan and the PRC (Koike, 2006).  Therefore, Lujala‘s (2009) framework should 
apply, with access to hydrocarbons intensifying the conflict. 
The next concern that applies to NEA is that of government corruption, where Russian oil 
and gas wealth has, according to Ross (2008), reduced the government officials‘ perceived 
need to serve the people instead of their own interests.  Trenin (2006) further supports these 
findings, and further contextualizes them saying that the business climate in Russia, including 
the RFE, which is rife with crime and corruption is one of the major impasses for Japanese 
business cooperation in developing the RFE.  Without the technological advancements, 
knowhow, and expertise, this is a major hurdle for development (Trenin, 2006).  Following 
the progress of the RFE oil and gas projects we should be able to see these theories at work. 
Further applying Ross‘ (2008) research to the NEA context we can hypothesize that North 
Korea must suffer from a kind of reverse Dutch disease caused by a failing economy and an 
energy infrastructure unable to support the country‘s needs.  Instead of oil exports devaluing 
their other sectors of industry, their low value industries are unable to shoulder the costs of 
importing oil, leaving the country‘s energy supplies and thus much of the economy tied to 
market forces.  The inability of North Korea to gain sufficient access to oil supplies has also 
been proposed as one of the major driving forces behind the Korean nuclear crisis (Brooke, 
2004). 
 
5 Methodological Design 
This thesis has a strong foundation in neorealist theory.  In contrast to realism, where states 
actions are determined by forces such as human nature, neorealism poses that existing 
structures, such as the economy, resources and international law are the driving forces that 
shape state behavior.  Like realism, neorealism also looks at international relations as being 
anarchic, with all states pursing first survival and then other goals.  In addition neo-realism, 
like realism, looks at international relations as a zero sum game; in order for one nation to 
gain power, another must lose some (Steans & Pettiford, 2005).  This approach is particularly 
useful in regards to energy, because even though the production of hydrocarbons may be 
increasing from year to year, the supply in any given year is finite, and thus nations must 
compete with each other to meet domestic demands; if there isn‘t enough someone will have 
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to do without.  This means that by analyzing the actions of states in relation to other states 
and to economic factors, in this case crude oil and natural gas, we can determine if there is a 
corresponding relationship between them and whether crude oil and natural gas are driving 
forces in the states‘ policies. 
To discover whether this is indeed the case, the study was designed with the specific intent 
that the results be objective and verifiable so that any results obtained will be as accurate as 
possible.  To allow for this, the specific steps involved in the analysis of the data used for 
answering the research questions are included. 
The first step is to provide a background for analysis through a comprehensive review of the 
character of NEA international relations and a discussion of NEA energy needs and security. 
Second is the qualitative analysis of the conflicts and analytical interpretation of the findings 
in order to answer the specific research questions for each.  Using a framework that 
presupposes energy security as a zero sum game at a global level, though not necessarily a 
regional level, this study will examine the actions undertaken by each nation, at different 
times regarding each conflict.  Actions taken by independent corporations will be considered 
reflections of national agendas particularly in regards to Russia, as the highly regulatory 
nature of the petroleum industry implies little room for a national corporation to maneuver 
against its home state and the interests of national petroleum corporations often coincides 
with the interest of the state as well.  These actions will be organized into timelines in order 
to attribute  numeric values to each period.  While it would be beneficial to use a shorter 
interval, say one month, thereby creating a larger array of data to analyze, data availability 
concerning oil and gas production, pricing and consumption is only readily available in 
annual amounts, thus necessitating an interval of one calendar year. 
For each period of the dispute an analytic judgment call will be made to determine whether it 
qualifies as a period of positive cooperation, or of conflict.  This judgment call will be based 
on a mixture of criteria, from offensive military action, to rhetoric, along with the responses 
of other nations to these actions.  In order to quantify qualitative data that is otherwise useless 
for the purposes of statistical analysis a numeric scale has been created to assign a conflict 
value (CV) that ranges from -4 to 4.  In this way periods that are cooperative or conflict-
ridden can be statistically compared to the quantitative oil data in order to discover if they 
have any mathematical correlation.  The timelines and their values, along with the reasons for 
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the values assigned, are located in the appendix for ease of reference and methodological 
transparency. 
With regard to the quantification of qualitative data each numerical value is assigned for 
periods where particular types of actions are taken.  Values for individual events are not so 
much added together to produce an annual rating as the events themselves are taken into 
consideration and an overall rating for the year is achieved. Regardless of the number or CV 
of events occurring in a given year, no period can receive a rating beyond its most extreme 
events.  That is if one particular year contains five ratings of 1 and two of -3, its overall rating 
cannot fall below -3 or surpass 1.  Furthermore, because not every year contains actions 
undertaken relative to the conflict, years where no relevant actions are taken will have no CV.  
This means that any year in which no events occurred, or in which a particular country had no 
events will not be used as a data set for the statistical analysis. 
Yearly CVs will be assigned to nations in each conflict to represent actions taken in that year 
which are relevant to the development of the conflict.  Because of the unique nature of the 
RFE oil and gas controversies, Russia will be assigned two CVs; one will be Russia to PRC 
and one will be Russia to Japan.  Attributing two separate CVs to Russian actions is 
necessary because Russian policy and actions may apply differently to the interests of Japan 
and the PRC, and as such may render different values heating the conflict relative to one 
actor and cooling it relative to another.  For each conflict an overall CV will also be assigned 
for each year where relevant actions by any nation(s) took place, reflecting the development 
of the conflict as a whole without regard to individual national interests. 
The selection of CVs shall use the following criteria.  A rating of 0 will be given for neutral 
actions or combined actions with a relatively neutral effect.  ±1 will mean declarations, 
rhetoric or other actions that lack a material effect.  ±2 will mean material actions of minor 
consequence, and ±3 will mean material actions of major consequence.  4 will mean an end to 
the conflict either through positive resolution which ends the conflict to the agreement of all 
concerned parties (+) or war (-). 
Examples for 0 are announcements or actions that do not really affect the conflict, such as 
suggesting a delay in negotiation.  ±1 could be announcing intent to negotiate, negotiating, or 
denouncing actions taken by others.  ±2 could be, as in the case of the Korean Nuclear 
Conflict, agreeing to shut down nuclear production in exchange for aid, or refusing to send 
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aid previously agreed upon.  Two examples of a level ±3 event are the test detonation of a 
nuclear warhead and test firing of missiles.  On the positive side of the scale it could also be 
taking the first steps in shutting down nuclear production, if they are real and in good faith.  
Because all of the conflicts analyzed in this thesis are ongoing without having escalated to 
war a value of ± 4 is purely theoretical, except in the case of the Sakhalin oil projects, where 
periods of cooperative production are seen as periods without any conflict; a sort of 
temporary resolution. 
Comprehensive tables for the prices and demands (globally, regionally and nationally) of oil 
and gas will then be created.  As natural gas pricing varies remarkably depending on the gas 
hub and whether or not LNG is used, this study prices gas using the LNG Japan hub gas 
prices.  This is done because as the two major consumers of natural gas in NEA the Republic 
of Korea and Japan both rely primarily on LNG (Vassiliouk, 2008).  Furthermore LNG 
accounts for over 90 percent of international gas flows in the Asian Pacific (Nicholls, 2003), 
making it the logical pricing index to use. 
Each dispute will use a different time period based upon the period from which it began.  The 
ECS territorial dispute will be analyzed from 1969 to 2007.  Because of difficulties 
associated with finding reliable data for gas prices prior to 1985, any analysis regarding gas 
prices or values will also be done starting then.  That means gas prices, the value of natural 
gas consumption, the required import value of natural gas, the combined value of natural gas 
and oil consumption and the required value of natural gas and oil combined imports will be 
correlated to PRC, Japan and overall CVs only from 1985 to 2007.  The disputes surrounding 
RFE oil and gas will be analyzed from 1975 to 2007, facing the same gas pricing restrictions 
as the ECS territorial dispute, and the Korean nuclear crisis from 1993 to through 2007. 
Following the completion of the tables, statistical analysis will then be used to compare the 
timelines of the conflicts to those of the oil and gas; a Microsoft® Office Excel® 2007 
spreadsheet will be used to compute the values and organize the data.  This will be done in 
order to determine whether there is a correlation between the demand in the petroleum sector 
and the actions taken by the nations involved.  Because of the limits of using statistical 
analysis, the correlation coefficients yielded will then be contextualized by the qualitative 
analysis done earlier, as well as being analyzed from a point of view of the original 
quantitative data itself.  In this way an answer to the primary research question can be found; 
whether the demand, consumption or value of oil, natural gas, or oil and natural gas 
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combined effect the actions undertaken by individual actors and overall in regard to the three 
disputes analyzed. 
5.1 Data Selection and Restrictions 
5.1.1 Selection of Empirical and Qualitative Data 
The data this thesis makes use of is a mixture of quantitative and qualitative.  In regards to 
crude oil and natural gas, it relies primarily on BP‘s energy statistics as found in the BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008.  The exception to this is in the case of the 
DPRK where, because of omission in BP‘s reports, the US Department of Energy-Energy 
Information Administration‘s data is used.  This is done to ensure as common a point of 
departure as possible regarding this data. 
The qualitative data used to build comprehensive event timelines consists of information 
gathered from a variety of sources including news agencies such as CNN and the BBC, as 
well as information gleaned from journals and texts.  To ensure the information is as accurate 
and unbiased as possible sources of many different nationalities were consulted, including but 
not limited to Russian, Swedish, Finnish, Japanese, South Korean and United States sources. 
5.1.2 Reliability of Empirical and Qualitative Data 
The reliability of the thesis rests first and foremost on the data collected.  Because of the 
impracticality of independently measuring all oil and natural gas statistics necessary, and the 
impossibility of personally observing all actions undertaken by actors in regards to the 
selected conflicts, this study relies upon various sources in academia, media and the 
petroleum industry.  Where possible an attempt has been made to use multiple sources for 
each topic in order to corroborate their validity. 
The other area of concern regarding the reliability of this study is regarding its analysis of the 
data collected.  In order to nullify this concern the study tries to be as open and objective as 
possible regarding analyses and selections.  Furthermore included in the appendix are all the 
numbers, timelines, trend lines and methods necessary to repeat and criticize the statistical 
analysis that has been done. 
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5.1.3 Criticism of Data Sources 
For the most part a variety of sources have been used for the qualitative data regarding the 
three disputes central to the thesis topic.  Because of the crosschecking involved in such a 
selection of the literature, reliability of the source data can be considered quite high. 
For quantitative data regarding oil and gas pricing, supply and availability the study relies 
primarily on the BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008.  Because the report 
includes contributions from many different agencies, organizations and companies, including 
the International Energy Agency, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development and the World Energy Council (BP, 2008b), there is little reason to believe that 
the physical measurements presented are any less valid than those of any other source for 
energy statistics. 
In NEA studies there seems to be three standard outlooks regarding the future that the region 
will take; they are optimism, pessimism and skepticism.  Because each of these carries with it 
certain implications for how different scholars interpret data, a variety of sources representing 
all three perspectives is important.  The hope is that by making use of enough sources any 
bias held by previous researchers will be balanced out, and the study will be left with an 
objective analysis. 
5.2 Ethical Considerations 
The primary ethical considerations taken into account in the development of this thesis are as 
basic and simple as they are important.  The first is to insure appropriate citation and 
reference to sources, not only to provide recognition to those from whose research the study 
has benefited, but also to allow for the reader to go back to the source to critique the study‘s 
analyses or to reproduce the study in order to verify or contradict its results. 
The next consideration that has been taken is to follow the ethical guidelines set down by the 
Swedish Research Counsel, as they are a requirement for this thesis and a well thought out 
criteria for engaging in morally acceptable research behavior. 
Finally the utmost attempt at transparent analysis and methodology has been taken to insure 
that the thesis contains no subterfuge in its results, so that any who would like to attempt to 
reproduce it will be able to do so, and so that there are no questions of motives or agenda 
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implied in the conclusion.  In this spirit, the appendix of the thesis includes a copy of all the 
timelines and tables used for statistical purposes. 
 
6 Disposition 
The study itself begins with comprehensive analysis of NEA as a region.  It looks into what 
defines NEA regionalism, its impediments and their solutions.  The study then looks at the 
role of energy in international relations, particularly the role of energy security.  NEA oil and 
gas statistics are also discussed. 
From there the three conflicts are discussed individually and in depth, and the role of oil and 
natural gas in each is analyzed.  Using statistical analysis it is determined whether the actions 
undertaken by the individual parties involved or the taken in regards to the conflict as a whole 
correlates with price, consumption, or needs of oil, natural gas, or oil and natural gas 
combined and the particular research sub-questions relevant to each conflict are answered. 
The study concludes by summarizing its findings and drawing conclusions that answer the 
particular research questions, namely the effects that hydrocarbon pricing and demand have 
on the international relations of NEA, particularly in regard to the ECS territorial dispute, the 
RFE oil and gas projects, and the Korean nuclear crisis.  Suggestions are then made for 
methods of modifying the study for further investigation into the role of energy in NEA 
international conflicts and the role of energy on international conflicts in general. 
 
7 Regional Background of Northeast Asia 
7.1 Defining Northeast Asian Regionalism 
The concept of what characteristics define regionalism can vary significantly from region to 
the next.  In regards to NEA Kim and Jones (2007, p. 1) claim that it is found in NEA‘s 
economic liberalization; ―Northeast Asia‘s integration is regionalization without regionalism.‖  
What they mean is that as NEA developed the states looked toward building bilateral 
relationships in order to catch up with other world regions in such a way as to avoid 
threatening a destabilization of power.  This was accomplished by many talks of FTAs and by 
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using agreements forged with one nation as leverage against another all the while attempting 
to avoid a situation that could result in Chinese and/or Japanese hegemony (Choi, 2003; Kim 
& Jones, 2007).  Kim and Jones (2007, p. 1) call this ―bilateral regionalism.‖  Effectively 
NEA is a region bound together by many small trade agreements, but without an all-
encompassing agreement.  This allows greater freedom to forge mutually beneficial 
agreements that act to tie the states together into what they call ―An interconnected web 
bound by transnational production networks‖ (Kim & Jones, 2007, p. 1) 
According to Choi (2003, p. 49) the period from the late 1980s the early 200s experienced a 
―veritable explosion of regional trade agreements/…/the exception was Northeast Asia.‖  In 
the early years of the 21
st
 century, China, Japan and the ROK did move towards expanding 
regionalism.  In 2001 China and ASEAN agreed to establish a FTA within ten years.  In 2002 
Japan signed a FTA with Singapore, and the ROK finalized its first ever FTA in an 
agreement with Chile (Choi, 2003).  While these moves do appear to create greater regional 
integration, albeit at a pan-Asian/pan-Pacific level, they are still following Kim and Jones‘s 
(2007, p. 1) model of ―bilateral regionalism.‖  Not only are the agreements involving Japan 
and the Republic of Korea bilateral agreements, but none of the three agreements reached 
involve other members of NEA. 
This regional contextualization also represents well the conflicts and disputes facing NEA, 
with the exception of the Korean Nuclear issue, where states engage in negotiation bilaterally, 
and where agreements on the same subject with one nation play little or no role in 
negotiations with another except to be used as leverage.  This can be seen in the ECS dispute 
where a resolution between Japan and the ROK was reached without the involvement of the 
PRC.  Furthermore, that agreement has had little, if any effect upon the dispute between 
Japan and The PRC (Drifte, 2008).  This is also evident in the case of the negations regarding 
the East Siberian Pipeline where Russia did its best to hold out making a decision as to which 
design to use, in an effort to garner better offers from Japan and the PRC. 
7.2 Impediments to Northeast Asian Regionalism 
Regarding NEA regionalism, Lambest (2003, p. 61) believes that ―NEA can best be 
characterized as grudging coexistence, not dynamic cooperation;‖ meaning that NEA has 
many problems and challenges that need to be addressed before its states can fully integrate 
with each other.  Lambest (2003) then goes on to list several areas he believes are key to fully 
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resolving NEA‘s problems.  Among them are poor regional definition, World War II and 
Cold War legacies, Russian central authority limiting RFE growth, US involvement, cultural 
and language barriers, the partition of the Korean Peninsula and infrastructural problems 
caused by the scale and climatic extremes of NEA.  In a way this thesis touches on all of 
these topics in that they all affect one or more of the disputes it analyzes. 
US involvement has played a large role in the in the Korean nuclear crisis, as one of the 
DPRK‘s primary security concerns is the overwhelming presence of US troops on the Korean 
Peninsula (Kim S. S., 2004).  US constant involvement in the dispute and in attempts to 
regionalize NEA also makes it harder for any resolutions to be reached, as the US will 
hamper efforts to reach goals not in its own interest (Lambest, 2003). 
Infrastructural problems are also a key to these disputes.  In the cases of the ECS and the 
Sakhalin I, II and Siberian pipeline disputes the remoteness of the resources means that a 
large investment must be made to extract the resources, creating a potential hurdle in the form 
of multilateral cooperation.  Indeed Sakhalin II is the world‘s largest integrated oil and gas 
project with 20 billion USD invested so far; at a price of 34 USD/Barrel its value to Russia is 
over 50 billion USD (The Economist, 2009; Watkins, 2006).  The cost of the entire project is 
estimated to be as much as 100 billion USD over a 40 year period (Clark, 2004).  When the 
Russian government used underhanded tactics in an effort to force the foreign companies 
running the project to renegotiate their contracts or face revocation of permits on 
environmental grounds, they were understandably upset (Upson, 2006).  The message is 
clear; Russia needs help to develop its infrastructure in the Far East but is reluctant to give up 
control to do so. 
The issue of Russian central control has had a negative impact on the regionalization of NEA.  
Rozman, Togo and Ferguson (2006) claim that Russia is worried that building too much 
regionalism in NEA would threaten Russian central control, as the decentralized RFE would 
loosen its ties to Moscow, and strengthen its ties to its neighboring states.  Thus it is no 
surprise that Russia has often been slow moving and even counterproductive when it comes 
to multilateral projects in NEA. 
According to Kim and Jones (2007) the major threat to regional stability comes not from the 
great powers (the PRC, Japan or Russia) but from the middle powers, that is mainly the 
DPRK.  While this is true in the extreme case of the Korean nuclear crisis, there are many 
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smaller conflicts with the potential to threaten regional stability, which do not include the 
middle powers.  The territorial dispute between the PRC and Japan in the ECS is one such 
conflict (Drifte, 2008; Lai, 2007), and the issues with RFE oil and gas development also have 
the possibility to hinder regional stability by decreasing the likelihood of large scale 
cooperative development projects (Watkins, 2006). 
The problems created by the DPRK, Kim and Jones (2007) assert, are based in the identity of 
its regime.  When the cold war ended the identity of these regimes had to be rebuilt.  The 
DPRK became a more extreme version of what it was, hoping to survive the transition, and 
cutting itself off further from the rest of the world. 
Identity may be a factor, but Lambest (2003) claims that the legacies NEA has inherited from 
the Cold War and the Second World War are one of the major obstacles for regionalization.  
Lambest (2003) identifies Japanese expansionism, territorial disputes, the Juche mentality in 
the DPRK, and Chinese sovereignty issues as the chief concerns.  Indeed it is the Juche 
mentality that has lead to the close off of North Korea and helped build the distrust that fuels 
the nuclear issue today (Rozman, 2007).  It is perceived Japanese expansionism, and 
memories of Japanese Imperial expansion that caused such an outrage when Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe questioned the facts surrounding the Japanese Army‘s forcing women 
into sex-slavery to serve the soldiers during World War II (The Economist, 2007).  It is 
territorial disputes between Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands, which helps to fuel 
Japanese distrust over Russian projects in the RFE (Ouimet, 2006) and it is Chinese and 
Japanese claims to the ECS that lies at the center of the conflict (Drifte, 2008; Lai, 2007). 
Together all these problems facing NEA show that examining the region through a purely 
realist, liberalist or constructivist perspective cannot work.  Kim (2004) is right when he says 
that 
All three analytical paradigms offer some insights into the various issue areas 
of NEA foreign policies, but none provides a completely satisfactory 
explanation of NEA‘s international politics as a whole.  Regional and country-
specific variations suggest that no one theory may be adequate./---/As Peter 
Katzenstein, and Muthia Alagappa, among others have argued ‗analytical 
eclecticism,‘ not theoretical parsimony, is a more promising yet 
underexplored way of more fully capturing and explaining the complex links 
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and interactions between power, interests, and norms underlying Asian 
international relations.‖5 
7.2.1 The Tumen River Area Development Project 
The problem with achieving an integrated economic system in NEA is shown by the fact that 
large scale cooperative projects in NEA tend not to work.  The best example is that of the 
Tumen River Area Development Project, an ambitious plan to create a free trade zone in 
NEA on the mouth of the Tumen River.  This was meant to be a major project involving all 
the nations of NEA plus Mongolia.  The project was initially projected to last fifteen to 
twenty years and cost 30 billion USD.  In the first nine years after the project was initialized 
in 1991, the total funding reached had only barely passed 1.5 billion USD, not nearly enough 
to make any substantial gains in development (Kim S. S., 2004). 
Kim (2004) poses that the project failed for several reasons.  The first is that the fall of the 
Soviet Union created a collapse in the Russian and North Korean economies that hampered 
the projects ability to begin.  Furthermore political differences between Japan and its 
neighbors resulted in Japan‘s refusal to take part, severely limiting the projects funding, as 
the majority of the financial investment was to be made by Japan and the Republic of Korea.  
The loss of Japan‘s technological knowhow, marketing and bureaucratic skills did not help 
any either. 
The failure of this project, which also involved the UN Development Program, highlights the 
difficulties in complicated multilateral negotiations.  The more parties that become involved 
in a project the greater the number of cultural and historical tensions that can be stressed.  
Furthermore, the more complicated the project becomes the harder it becomes for each party 
to see the anticipated return it could provide, and the project suffers from lack of enthusiasm 
and rising costs (Kim S. S., 2004). 
The case of the Tumen River Area Development Project teaches a valuable lesson regarding 
multilateral negotiations in NEA.  The same setbacks that have plagued it are also plaguing 
the disputes discussed in this study; the Sakhalin II project faced rising costs that obscured 
Russia‘s perceived returns (Wood, 2007), and the Korean nuclear crisis is riddled with 
                                                          
5
 While this study takes a neorealist point of departure for analysis, it does not conflict with Kim‘s statement as 
it goes beyond a purely theoretical neorealist framework to attempt to give a comprehensive view of the 
contributing factors involved in the conflicts discussed. 
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distrust and animosity because of historic tensions and suspicions of deceit (Brooke, 2004).  
In order to overcome these differences and difficulties sufficient motivation is necessary.  It 
is one of the purposes of this study to determine if need for energy security is one of them. 
7.3 Solutions for Building Northeast Asian Regionalism 
Kim and Jones (2007) pose three sources of potential change for NEA to bring about stronger 
regionalization.  They are a power transition (a recent trend of bottom up foreign policy in 
democracies), economic interdependence (clearly an energy based interdependence qualifies), 
and democratization.  Haggard (2007) agrees with the second when he claims that ―most 
empirical studies find an inverse relationship between interdependence and war‖ (p. 36).   
Nakano (2003) does as well stating that the key for NEA security is economic development; 
it functions as a type of preventative measure.  If Kim and Jones, Haggard and Nakano are 
correct, then as the nations of NEA become further integrated, the conflicts which currently 
abound will decrease, that is if one can make the leap from a reduction in war to a reduction 
in other forms of conflict as well. 
Haggard (2007, p. 37) is careful not to appear too optimistic however, as he states that ―North 
Korea makes NEA fail the integration model, as it isn‘t integrated, as exemplified by the 
2006 missile and nuclear tests.‖  While this is correct in the strictest sense of integration, the 
DPRK does rely on the outside world for imports of oil.  Because of the energy crisis they 
face, they are effectively integrated in the energy framework.  The fact that they resort to 
threats of violence to insure energy supply, which if acted upon, would surely lead to larger 
problems, shows how necessary the region truly is in an energy context.  This in turn implies 
that the integration model, as envisioned by Haggard, does not necessarily apply in regards to 
energy security and integration. 
Another claim Haggard (2007, p. 36) makes in relation to integration is that ―integration 
creates demand for better mechanisms that spills over into other areas of co-operation.‖  If 
this is true, then building stronger energy ties with the DPRK would surely lead to a demand 
for other projects that would lead to further integration and mitigation of the nuclear threat. 
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8 Energy 
8.1 Energy Security 
Energy security first entered into discourse during the oil shocks of the 1970s.  During this 
period of sudden price jumps, scholars and bureaucrats began to realize that comprehensive 
plans for insuring energy supplies were designed and implemented.  In its earliest form 
energy security was considered the ability to procure ―reliable supplies of energy at 
reasonable costs‖ (Gavin & Lee, 2007, p. 403).  Today the focus lies more on sustainability 
as well as costs and reliability (Gavin & Lee, 2007). 
There are two basic approaches to energy security: strategic and market-based.  The strategic 
approach involves insuring supply through development, investment, political relations, and 
physically protecting supplies and shipments.  Market-based approaches seek equilibrium 
through diversification of energy sources and suppliers, efficiency and liberalizing energy 
markets.  Both approaches are necessary for comprehensive energy security.  Indeed they are 
complementary (Gavin & Lee, 2007). 
By far, the simplest common way to insure energy security is through diversification.  
Another alternative is to build a pipeline.  Nicholls (2003, p. 1) claims that ―for importing 
countries, pipelines are an exclusive source of supply and represent energy security.‖  
Kensuke Kanekiyo (2004a) has found that in terms of costs, an oil pipeline equals ten percent 
of the end price of the oil, less than one third the cost of rail transport, while a gas pipeline 
equals 50 percent of the end cost of the natural gas.  In any case, building an oil pipeline is 
likely to make a favorable impact on the energy security of the importing country, but a gas 
pipeline requires a greater number of precise circumstances to provide the same benefit. 
8.1.1 The Energy Security Context in Northeast Asia 
In 2005 NEA alone accounted for 20 percent of world oil consumption (Gavin & Lee, 2007).  
In addition China, Japan, Russia and South Korea are the second, third, fourth and ninth 
largest consumers of crude oil in the world respectively (United States Energy Information 
Administration, 2009).  Together Japan and the ROK account for 70 percent of global LNG 
demand (Gavin & Lee, 2007).  Russia alone holds around six percent of global oil reserves 
and over 25 percent of global natural gas reserves, most of which is found in Siberia and the 
RFE (Kiesow, 2008)  In essence NEA is a region desperately in need of crude oil and natural 
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gas, which coincidentally it can provide itself.  The key will be working together to establish 
comprehensive energy plans that benefit all parties (Kanekiyo, 2004a).  
8.2 Northeast Asian Energy Outlook 
In order to understand the actual energy needs of NEA it is necessary to perform a time series 
analysis of energy production, consumption and value.  When analyzing energy needs one 
can focus on a single commodity, a combination of commodities, the gross volume of 
consumption, the required yearly imports to meet consumption, the price value of 
commodities, or any other number of factors. 
This study looks at the consumption of crude oil and natural gas in terms of volume and value, 
the necessary volume and value of imports of each to meet the year‘s consumption (demand) 
and the combined value of oil and natural gas in yearly consumption, and import 
requirements. 
8.2.1 Yearly Consumption and Import of Crude Oil 
Looking at the yearly crude oil consumption throughout NEA we can see that Japan and the 
DPRK have remained fairly stable in terms of total consumption, with Japanese consumption 
even declining from the mid 1990s.   Overall demand in the PRC and the ROK however, has 
been steadily increasing.  Russia has also shows drastically decreased total consumption in 
1985.  This is easily explained however, as data for Russian energy is only available from 
1985 onwards, and we mus rely on USSR statistics if we wish to go back farther. Beginning 
in the early 1990s Russia again shows decreased consumption, this time less dramatically and 
corresponding to the fall of the USSR  (see Figure 8-1). 
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Figure 8-1—Yearly Crude Oil Consumption (Volume) 
Source: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and EIA - International 
Energy Data and Analysis 
 
When examining the value of the crude oil however, one can see that there have been peeks 
and troughs, rising to a very high peek in recent years (see Figure 8-2).   This is true 
regardless whether the country in question has been able to curb its rising need for oil or not; 
the recent increases in price have had a measured impact. 
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Figure 8-2—Yearly Crude Oil Consumption (Value) 
Source: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and EIA - International 
Energy Data and Analysis 
 
If we look at the net required imports to meet domestic demand, however, we can see that 
Russia is able to meet its entire domestic supply and is thus an oil exporter, while all others 
require foreign supplies (see Figure 8-3).  In point of fact, only Russia and the PRC actually 
produce any crude oil domestically, meaning Japan, the DPRK and the ROK must rely 
entirely on oil extracted from foreign sources. 
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Figure 8-3—Yearly Required Imports of Crude Oil (Volume) 
Source: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and EIA - International 
Energy Data and Analysis 
 
Once again, when we adjust for value of the required imports of oil, we find that Russia is 
making far more on its exports of oil than ever before, and that all the other nations are facing 
highly increased competition with one another for access (see Figure 8-4).  By using 
statistical analysis we can see if the consumption or the price of oil in any way reflects the 
actions undertaken by these countries when they find themselves in conflict, particularly over 
issues that are directly related to the petroleum industry. 
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Figure 8-4— Yearly Required Imports of Crude Oil (Value) 
Source: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and EIA - International 
Energy Data and Analysis 
 
 
8.2.2 Yearly Consumption and Import of Natural Gas 
Examining the consumption of natural gas since 1969, we find a similar trend as the one we 
found for oil.  Once again Russia has a sharp dip 1985, again because of the data switch from 
the Soviet Union to Russia.  Again in the early 1990s Russia‘s consumption falls again, likely 
due to the effects of the fall of the USSR.  Japan, the PRC and the ROK all have a steadily 
increasing demand, and only the DPRK has zero reliance on natural gas.  This is likely due to 
the economic closing off of the DPRK combined with a lack of resources and appropriate 
infrastructure (See Figure 8-5).  
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Figure 8-5—Yearly Natural Gas Consumption (Volume) 
Source: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and EIA - International 
Energy Data and Analysis 
 
Because of the unavailability of reliable gas prices dating before 1885, the scale on the value 
of yearly natural gas consumption is slightly skewed.  It retains for the most part, however a 
very similar trend to the volumetric consumption, with perhaps a faster incline in recent years.  
Overall the stability of natural gas prices in the long term mean that it is unlikely that there 
will be much statistical difference in correlation between a volumetric comparison and a 
value-based comparison (see Figure 8-6). 
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Figure 8-6—Yearly Natural Gas Consumption (Value) 
Source: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and EIA - International 
Energy Data and Analysis 
 
Examining the difference between the produced natural gas and the consumed natural gas we 
can make a few interesting conclusions.  The first is that while Russia, as the Soviet Union, 
began the 1970s consuming more than it produced, it quickly began to produce so much more 
that by the end of the seventies it had a production surplus beyond the production deficit that 
it had experienced previously.  The next is that Japan and the ROK, after they started using 
natural gas, have both steadily increased their domestic consumption.  The PRC evidently 
consumed as much natural gas as they produced until the late 1990s.  The interesting point 
here is that it conforms well to the timeline of gas discovery and extraction in the ECS.  Once 
again the DPRK which consumes no gas also requires no imports (see Figure 8-7). 
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Figure 8-7—Yearly Required Imports of Natural Gas (Volume) 
Source: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and EIA - International 
Energy Data and Analysis 
 
Adjusting the yearly required imports to account for pricing makes little difference in the 
general trend.  Again the scale is slightly different beginning in 1985.  The apparent 
differences in slope can be accounted for primarily by differences in scale (see Figure 8-8). 
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Figure 8-8—Yearly Required Imports of Natural Gas (Value) 
Source: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and EIA - International 
Energy Data and Analysis 
 
 
9 Empirical and Contextual Analysis 
9.1 The East China Sea Territorial Dispute 
9.1.1 Overview 
In the ECS conflict, Japan and the PRC both claim ownership or rights to the sea bed between 
the Okinawa Islands and Taiwan.  The ROK also has some claims to areas in the north, but as 
of yet little controversy has occurred in their regard since a deal was struck with Japan in 
1977 and surveys done of the areas has yielded no signs of gas or oil (Drifte, 2008; Lai, 2007). 
The controversy between the PRC and Japan stems from a UN survey which held that there 
were likely very large reserves of oil in the area.  Following this the PRC and Japan both 
stated that they had rights to the area, based on differing interpretations of international 
maritime law.  Japan has stated that median line between territorial lands should be used, and 
china claims that their rights extend all the way to the Okinawa trough.  Even while the area 
was in dispute China started test drilling and developing the area, even going so far as to 
build pipelines, which strangely enough were partially funded by Japan via the Asian 
Development Bank and what at the time was known as Japan‘s Export-Import Bank.  
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Whether this was intended as a strategic move toward joint development is unknown, but it is 
likely a case of separate entities working with separate agendas.  The end result is that today, 
even after much rhetoric and posturing China holds practical ownership, while Japan engages 
in diplomatic measures to ensure access without angering China (Drifte, 2008). 
9.1.2 The Role of Energy in the Dispute 
Energy plays an obvious role in this dispute, residing in the fact that the dispute centers on 
access to natural gas.  Examining Chinese and Japanese natural gas needs, and comparing 
them to the progress of the dispute one can very easily see that there is no correlation 
between the willingness of the Japanese or Chinese willingness to cooperate and any of the 
variables associated with the petroleum industry (see Figure 9-1 for a graphic example).   
Neither price, nor value of demand, nor volume of demand, nor export volume plays a role in 
determining the actions taken by the state.  Not even the confrontational/cooperative actions 
taken by the opposing state can be seen as having a direct correlating impact to the actions 
taken by the other.  The actions taken in each case can instead be seen as a logical 
progression of events.  The previous actions of the other government, the desire to maintain 
national interests, and the desire for a peaceful resolution are all seen as primary factors. 
Figure 9-1—Prices of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Overlaid with PRC, Japanese and 
Overall CVs 
Sources: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and original analyses 
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When the potential for oil and gas was discovered Japan and the PRC expanded their claims.  
When the opposing nation refused to cooperate there was posturing and rhetoric.  It was not 
until China took the first step toward development (for whatever mix of reasons) that the 
balance shifted and Japan was left fighting for a more even resolution, as opposed to the one 
in their best interest; a blowout victory for Japan is no longer possible because of the 
establishment of Chinese Development in the region (Drifte, 2008). 
9.1.3 Statistical Correlations 
Statistically speaking the two most significant coefficients of correlation were both 
approximately -0.746; they were Japanese CV to Japanese oil consumption by volume and 
Japanese CV to Japanese required oil imports by volume  (see appendix for timeline of the 
dispute including justification for selected CVs and comprehensive tables of the data used 
and results of the statistical correlations).  As Japan does not produce any oil domestically we 
can then analyze these two correlations at the same time because they represent the same 
measurement.  This is what can be described as a moderate linear correlation.  Graphically 
representing the correlation reveals that while there is somewhat of a linear trend for the data 
points, it is because there are two main areas where points are grouped, implying a greater 
correlation than there really is, as can be deduced from the apparently random distribution of 
points (see Figure 9-2). 
Figure 9-2—Correlation of Japanese CV to Jampanese Oil Consumption 
Sources: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and original analyses 
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Examining the context of the original data however, yields a clearer picture.  Because neither 
the Japanese CV nor Japanese oil consumption changes very much over the course of the 
conflict except in the last few years where Japanese oil consumption increases and the 
Japanese CV becomes more negative, it is hard to attribute much significance to value of the 
correlation coefficient in this case.  The other coefficients that held moderate linear 
correlation also suffered from similar contextual limitations. 
Referring back to the main sub-question asked in regards to this dispute, the study attempted 
to discover to what extent the domestic demands for oil and gas in the PRC and in Japan has 
affected the overall dispute.  Statistically speaking there is no correlation between PRC or 
Japanese oil and/or gas consumption, production or value and the actions they have taken in 
regards to the ECS conflict. 
9.2 The Russian Far East Crude Oil and Natural Gas Projects 
9.2.1 Overview 
9.2.1.1 Sakhalin I and II 
In the early 1970s the Soviet Union began negotiations with Japan regarding the development 
of oil and natural gas in the RFE culminating in the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas 
Exploration Project Joint Agreement which was abandoned due to political pressures 
(Vassiliouk, 2008). 
The project was re-launched in 1996 with the creation of the Sakhalin I and Sakhalin II oil 
and natural gas development projects lead by international consortiums which both included 
Japanese corporations (Campaign, 2007; Kalashnikov, 1999). 
Sakhalin II Phase I began producing oil in 1999 and Sakhalin I began producing oil and 
natural gas in 2005.  Phase II of Sakhalin II was approved in 2004 (Vassiliouk, 2008). 
In 2005 Russian state-owned Gazprom began trying to buy controlling interests of Sakhalin II, 
when the proposed cost was projected to double to 20 billion USD for fears of delays in 
reaping returns.  The companies involved in Sakhalin II were also left off the short list for 
developing the Shtokman gas field (Wood, 2007). 
In 2006 Russia threatened to revoke Sakhalin II permits, on environmental grounds 
(Campaign, 2007; Watkins, 2006).  Russia later backtracked, saying they had no desire to 
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revoke the permits (Watkins, "A softer tone on Sakhalin-2", 2006).  In the end Russia won 
out, and the foreign companies that made up the Sakhalin II consortium agreed to sell 
controlling shares of the project to Gazprom (The Economist, 2006; Turkeltaub & Bailey, 
2007).  Afterward Russia assured Japan that the promised supplies of natural gas from 
Sakhalin II would be kept (Watkins, 2007b) 
9.2.1.2 The East Siberia Pipeline 
In 2003 then Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of the PRC Hu Jintao signed a 
agreement solidifying Russia and Chinese energy cooperation and finalizing a deal between 
Yukos Oil Company and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation to ship 5 billion barrels 
of oil to China from 2005 to 2030 via a yet un-built pipeline from Angarsk in to Daqing 
(Gulick, 2007) (See Figure 9-3 for a detailed map of current and potential pipeline routes). 
Figure 9-3—Potential Energy Flow from Eastern Russia 
Source: (Vassiliouk, 2008, p. 6) 
 
Even as Russia was expanding its oil exports to China (Gulick, 2007; Lai, 2007), Japan was 
offering of soft loans for the project if it was rerouted to the Pacific; 14 billion USD for the 
pipeline‘s development and 2 billion USD for new explorations (Gulick, 2007).  On the last 
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day of 2004 Russia unveiled its new East Siberian Pipeline route from Taishet to Nakhodka, 
instead of Angarsk to Daqing (Gulick, 2007). 
Soon thereafter Russia announced the design of a branch to Daqing on the Taishet to 
Nakhodka route (Lai, 2007).  Russia voiced ambitions to build a gas pipeline to South Korea, 
either across the Korean Peninsula or across the sea by running it through China (Brooke, 
2004; Nicholls, 2003).  Concurrently, Russia was further solidifying its energy relationship 
with the PRC (Gulick, 2007). 
Later Russia unveiled the official blueprint of a new East Siberian Pipeline route stopping in 
Skovorodino, halfway to Nakhodka, with a possible spur to Daqing.  Russia also cast doubts 
that the second half would be built saying it depended on oil extraction and regardless 
construction would not begin until at the earliest in 2012.  Putin also declared that when the 
first half of the pipeline was complete two thirds of the oil would be sent by rail to China and 
one third to Nakhodka, to be shipped to Japan and other markets (Gulick, 2007). 
Construction on the first section of the East Siberian Pipeline began in 2006 (Gulick, 2007).  
It is due to be finished this year; the second section was also given approval for construction 
in 2008 (Vassiliouk, 2008). 
9.2.2 The Role of Energy in the Russian Far East Oil and Gas Projects 
The energy projects in the RFE are by their very nature all about oil and gas.  Despite 
political goings on that interject other complexities into the discussion, such as Japan‘s 
attempts to make their soft loans offers contingent on solving the Kurile Island dispute 
(Gulick, 2007), the economic aspect has prevailed. 
Unsolved disputes between Japan and Russia of a political nature no longer seem to have the 
detrimental impact they used to (Vassiliouk, 2008); indeed Japan is now the single largest 
investor in the RFE in an effort to diversify energy sources (The Economist, 2004).  Scarce 
domestic energy supply has become a weakness for Japanese diplomacy (Koike, 2006); 
energy issues are forcing Japan to be less assertive (The Economist, 2007). 
Russia‘s relationship with China is no different, save that in 2004 they solved the territorial 
dispute that had been hindering their relations, allowing them to form a strategic partnership 
(Trenin, 2006).  Indeed the agreement between Putin and Hu to make Russia China‘s 
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preferred supplier and China Russia‘s preferred customer, with energy as the top priority for 
relations (Gulick, 2007), supports the idea that energy security is fast becoming a priority 
NEA. 
9.2.3 Statistical Correlations 
Using statistical analysis to correlate the events of the RFE oil and gas projects to quantitative 
data regarding the oil and gas statistics relative to the nations involved in the projects and 
NEA as a whole yields some interesting results (see appendix for timeline of the dispute 
including justification for selected CVs and comprehensive tables of the data used and results 
of the statistical correlations). 
The first is the multitude of high value correlation coefficients involving the Russia to PRC 
CV and the PRC CV.  While these numbers are very high for statistical purposes, they are not 
very valid for drawing conclusions, as the Russia to PRC CV and the PRC CV have only 
three inputs (see Figure 9-4).  The nature of Russian-Chinese cooperation in these areas is 
fairly recent, and an improving trend in relations does correspond very well with recent 
trends in the hydrocarbon industry.  Using month to month oil and natural gas data would be 
a better way to determine if there are indeed any correlations, but for now we must be content 
to accept that while there very well may be a statistical correlation the results of this study in 
regards to these particular correlations are inconclusive. 
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Figure 9-4—Correlation of Russia to PRC and PRC CVs to Prices of Crude Oil and 
Natural Gas 
Sources: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and original analyses 
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that there are only 5 points available.  Graphically examining these points we can see that like 
the correlations involving the Russia to PRC and PRC CVs the points do fit very well along 
the trend line (See Figure 9-5).  While this implies that there could very well be a true 
statistical correlation between the respective series, once again the low number of data points 
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Figure 9-5 Correlation of Russia to Japan CV to Price of Natural Gas, Japanese 
Consumption of Natural Gas by Value and Japanese Required Imports of Crude Oil 
and Natural Gas Combined Value 
Sources: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008 and original analyses 
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Furthermore, contextual analysis implies that Russian desire for control of RFE oil and gas 
projects is influenced by the price of natural gas, as the actions taken to acquire controlling 
shares in the Sakhalin II project in 2006 correspond with rapid price increases and a near 
doubling in price from when the initial agreement was made in 1996 (BP, 2008a; Campaign, 
2007). 
9.3 The Korean Nuclear Crisis 
9.3.1 Overview 
The nuclear crisis traces its beginnings to the fall of the Soviet Union.  In the early 1990s 
North Korea was no longer able to rely on much of the support and aid from the USSR that it 
had previously relied upon (Brooke, 2004).  This sent the PDRK into an energy crisis, to 
which they responded by declaring their intent to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty.  After much negotiation the PDRK agreed to halt their nuclear program 
in exchange for energy aid from the US, South Korea and Japan.  In addition, they were to 
receive two light water reactors for peaceful power generation (BBC NEWS, 2007; Brooke, 
2004; CNN.com, 2004). 
By the late 1990s little progress had been made in building the reactors and easing US 
sanctions (Brooke, 2004), and in 1998 North Korea began to conduct missile tests.  An 
agreement was later reached to freeze the missile program in exchange for easing sanctions.  
By 2000 the light water reactors were still unfinished and the PDRK declared that unless 
compensation was made for the loss of energy resulting from the delays in construction, they 
would restart their nuclear program.  The following year, they threatened to restart missile 
tests if the US continued to refuse to normalize relations (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 
2004). 
In 2002 the PDRK admitted that they had secretly continued their nuclear program in 
violation of the 1994 agreement (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007).  
Japan and the ROK respond by halting their shipments aid in the form of oil to the PDRK 
(BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004). 
In 2003 North Korea tested two land-to-ship missiles into the Sea of Japan, withdrew from 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and announced that it had restarted its nuclear program.  
Later that year three way talks are held in Beijing between China, the US and the PDRK, 
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followed by the first round of six-party talks (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 
2007). 
From then on the six-party talks have been the primary method of negotiation used to seek a 
solution to the problem.  Even as diplomatic relations have unfolded, North Korea still 
decided to take several offensive actions that have hampered the ability of the involved 
parties to negotiate.  In 2006 they test fired seven missiles, including a Taepodong-2 rocket 
believed capable of reaching the United States, and they engaged in an underground test of a 
nuclear weapon, both of which lead to UN Security Council sanctions (BBC NEWS, 2007; 
CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
9.3.2 The Role of Energy in the Crisis 
From these events it is clear that the major concern of North Korea is energy security.  Every 
time negotiations have occurred, the PDRK insists in energy aid as a stipulation of 
disarmament and disbandment of their nuclear program (Watkins, 2007a).  Eric Watkins 
(2007a, p. 30), senior correspondent for Oil & Gas Journal, even sees this as trend whereby 
North Korea will continue to demand more oil and energy aid packages in exchange for 
compliance, even going so far as to suggest that the amount of aid demanded will go up 
―bomb by bomb.‖ 
9.3.3 Statistical Correlations 
Examining the results of the statistical correlations, we can see that no correlations exist 
between the actions undertaken by the five nations of NEA and the consumption or value of 
hydrocarbons (see appendix for timeline of the crisis including justification for selected CVs 
and comprehensive tables of the data used and results of the statistical correlations).  The 
only possible exceptions are in the cases of Japan and the ROK where correlation coefficients 
of approximately .844, .804 and .745 were yielded between the Japanese CV and the volume 
of gas import requirements of China, the Japanese CV and the value of North Korean oil 
consumption and the ROK CV and the value of North Korean oil consumption respectively.
6
 
                                                          
6
 The same correlation coefficient values are yielded for the Japanese and South Korean CVs and the value of 
North Korean oil consumption, the value of North Korean required oil imports and North Korean and the value 
of North Korean combined oil and gas consumption and required imports.  As the PDRK produces no oil and 
consumes no natural gas, these values are effectively the same, i.e. they all represent the correlation between the 
Japanese and South Korean CVs and the value of North Korean oil consumption. 
39 | P a g e  
 
In the cases of correlations involving the Russian and Chinese CVs and North Koreas natural 
gas consumption, no correlation coefficient can be obtained.  This is because all three of 
these series have no change over the course of the time period analyzed (1993-2007).  This 
shows us that regardless of energy statistics, both Russia and the PRC have maintained the 
exact same level of cooperation, i.e. they have attempted to negotiate with the PDRK and 
have engaged in multilateral negotiations such as the six-party talks.  Neither country has 
reached any agreements of any value with North Korea, however, nor has either country 
issued threats or taken actions that could result in worsening the conflict. 
By examining the three most significant correlations in graphical form, it is possible to better 
contextualize whether this is indeed a true correlation, or an anomalous one (See Figure 9-6).  
In the case of PRC natural gas import requirements, we can see that because the value of the 
imported gas is negative, the PRC was actually exporting natural gas.  This means that there 
is an apparent negative correlation between PRC natural gas exports, and the willingness of 
Japan to cooperate with North Korea in regards to the nuclear crisis.  Examining the trend of 
just PRC natural gas exports, we can see that the while the volume has been steadily 
increasing, the value of the exports peeked around the year 2000.  Because there is no 
correlation between the natural gas price index and the Japanese CV, this is most likely an 
anomalous correlation, caused in part by the large grouping of points where the value of PRC 
gas exports was hovering around 200,000 USD/day, and Japan was engaging in the six-party 
talks without taking any other actions relevant to the crisis. 
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Figure 9-6—Correlation of Japanese and Korean CVs to Select Hydrocarbon Data 
Sources: The BP Statistical World Review of Energy June 2008, EIA - International Energy 
Data and Analysis and original analyses 
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began taking overtly violent actions, such as test firing missiles the consumption of oil began 
to significantly decline once again.  In terms of actions taken the Japanese and ROK 
governments, the decision to stop the energy aid they had been providing in the form of fuel 
oil seems to have had little immediate effect on the overall consumption of oil in North Korea. 
Recalling the specific sub-question asked in reference to this crisis, the analysis shows that 
crude oil and natural gas prices have little apparent affect on the willingness of any party to 
negotiate.  Furthermore, while hydrocarbons do play an intricate role in the crisis, there is no 
real statistical connection between their empirical values and the unfolding of the crisis. 
 
10 Conclusion 
This study set out to discover what connections the oil and gas industry has to the current 
international conflict environment in NEA, if any at all.  Particularly this study asked whether 
the countries of NEA are more likely to take a cooperative or an obstinate stance on regional 
disputes when the supply of crude oil and/or natural gas is scarce and/or in high demand. 
Taking into consideration the correlation coefficients yielded by the study‘s method of 
analysis, it is evident that there is little if any statistical correlation between the crude oil and 
natural gas empirical data and the conflicts analyzed.  In the cases of the RFE oil and gas 
projects and the Korean nuclear crisis, however there were several correlations that looked 
promising and very well could yield a statistical connection if more data points were 
available.   Unfortunately the only correlations that yielded strong coefficients suffered from 
a lack of data points, making the correlations themselves inconclusive. 
Examining the statistical data in context of NEA and the individual disputes also implied that 
there is a connection between the numerical values associated with the hydrocarbon industry 
and aspects of several conflicts in NEA.  One such example is the possible connection 
between the volume of North Korean crude oil consumption and actions undertaken by Japan 
and South Korean; namely the decision to stop the export of aid in the form of fuel oil.  
Another is the potential connection between natural gas prices and consumption and the 
actions undertaken by Russia in regards to Japan and the PRC in the RFE oil and gas projects. 
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In summary this study has found no significant statistical correlations between the oil and gas 
industry and the conflicts facing NEA.  Nevertheless, qualitative analysis has indicated that 
some connections may exist, though not strictly empirical in nature, nor are they predominant.  
For the most part, political policy still drives much of the decision making process, and 
energy security is not the primary concern for NEA countries when attempting to resolve 
disputes, controversies and crises. 
 
11 Suggestions for Improvements and Further Research 
The main obstacle encountered in this study involved statistical analysis where too low a 
number of data points were available to be conclusive.  In order to provide for a greater and 
more varied data selection it could be helpful to use a monthly analysis as opposed to one 
done at yearly intervals. 
Selecting more or different conflicts could also yield new results, as could a comprehensive 
analysis of all the conflicts and all actions undertaken by all the nations of NEA in their 
regards.  Selecting a different region could also yield different connections than those found 
in NEA, and further understanding in the fields of peace and conflict studies and energy 
security. 
  
43 | P a g e  
 
12 Bibliography 
BBC NEWS. (2007, December 6). BBC NEWS | Asia-Pacific | Timeline: N Korea nuclear 
stand-off. Retrieved December 12, 2008, from BBC NEWS: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/2604437.stm 
BP. (2008a). BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008. Retrieved January 15, 2009, 
from Statistical Review of World Energy 2008|BP: 
http://www.bp.com/productlanding.do?categoryId=6929&contentId=7044622 
BP. (2008b). Links to contributors| Statistical Review 2008| BP. Retrieved January 15, 2009, 
from BP Globabl| BP: 
http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9023804&contentId=7044120 
Brooke, J. (2004, February 3). "Two Energy Plans for North Korea." The New York Times , p. 
W:1. 
Campaign. (2007, March 30). "Russia." Campaign , p. 33. 
Choi, W.-M. (2003). "Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Prospect and 
Jurisprudence." Journal of International Economic Law , 6:1, 49-77. 
Clark, J. (2004). "Sakhalin II partners let pipeline, platform contracts." Oil & Gas Journal , 
102:16, 22. 
CNN.com. (2004, January 6). CNN.com - Timeline: North Korea's nuclear weapons 
development - Jan. 6, 2004. Retrieved December 12, 2008, from CNN.com: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/08/20/nkorea.timeline.nuclear/ 
Drifte, R. (2008). "The politics of the East China Sea gas dispute: ongoing discussion 
between China and Japan." In T. J. Schoenbaum (Ed.), Peace in Northeast Asia (pp. 7-23). 
Cornwall, Great Britain: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc. 
Energy Information Administration. (2008). Korea, North Energy Profie; data. Retrieved 
January 15, 2009, from EIA - International Energy Data and Analysis: 
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/country_time_series.cfm?fips=KN 
Flint, P. (2008). "Oil is a Commodity Except When it is Not." Air Transport World , 45:5, 25. 
Fujime, K. (2002). LNG Market and Price Formation in East Asia. The Institute of Energy 
Economics, Japan. 
Gavin, B., & Lee, S. (2007). "Regional energy cooperation in North East Asia: Lessons from 
the European Experience." Asia Europe Journal , 5:3, 401–415. 
Gulick, J. (2007). "Russo-Chinese Energy Cooperation; Stepping Stone from Strategic 
Partnership to Geo-economic Integration?" International Journal of Comparative Sociology , 
48:2–3, 203 – 233. 
44 | P a g e  
 
Haggard, S. (2007). "US Influence in a Changing Asia." In B.-K. Kim, & A. Jones (Eds.), 
Power and Security in Northeast Asia; Shifting Strategies (pp. 23-53). Boulder, Colorado, 
USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
Hoyas, C. (2006, October 18). "Opec vows to defend minimum $60 for oil." The Financial 
Times . 
Kalashnikov, V. D. (1999). The Russian Far East and Northeast Asia: Aspects of Energy 
Demand and Supply Cooperation. Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University. 
Kanekiyo, K. (2004b). "Diversifying Energy Sources of Northeast Asia; Role of Government 
Initiative toward Sustainable Development." The 8th International Conference on Northeast 
Asian Natural Gas Pipeline. Shanghai: The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. 
Kanekiyo, K. (2004a). The Northeast Asia Natural Gas Pipeline Network; A desirable way of 
diversifying energy sources of northeast Asia. The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. 
Kangas, R. (2007). "The Changing Face of the Russian Far East: Cooperation and Resource 
Competition Between Japan, Korea, and China in Northeast Asia." Perspectives on Global 
Development and Technology , 6, 411-460. 
Kiesow, I. (2008). The Global Race for Oil and Gas: Power Politics and Principles in Asia. 
Singapore: Institute for Security and Development Policy. 
Kim, B.-K., & Jones, A. (2007). "Introduction: The Question of Power and Order in 
Northeast Asia." In B.-K. Kim, & A. Jones (Eds.), Power and Security in Northeast Asia; 
Shifting Strategies (pp. 1-20). Boulder, Colorado, USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
Kim, S. S. (2004). "Northeast Asia in the Loca-Regional-Global Nexus: Multiple Challenges 
and Contending Explanations." In S. S. Kim (Ed.), The International Relations of Northeast 
Asia (pp. 2-61). USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Koike, M. (2006). "Japan Looks for Oil in the Wrong Places." Far Eastern Economic 
Review , 169:8, 44-47. 
Lai, H. H. (2007). "China's oil diplomacy: is it a global security threat?" Third World 
Quarterly , 28:3, 519 – 537. 
Lambest, B. H. (2003). "Northeast Asian Dynamism: Ten Top Impediments and 
Countermeasures." In M. Ikegami (Ed.), New Northesast Asia Initiatives; Cooperation for 
Regional Develpment and Security (pp. 61-76). Stockholm: The Center for Pacific Asia 
Studies, Department of Oriental Languages, Stockholm University. 
Lujala, P. (2009). "Deadly Combat over Natural Resources: Gems, Petroleum, Drugs, and the 
Severity of Armed Civil Conflict." Journal of Conflict Resolution , 53, 50-71. 
Nakano, T. (2003). "A Grand Design of Northeast Asia." In M. Ikegami (Ed.), New Northeast 
Asia Initiatives; Cooperation for Regional Development and Securtiy (pp. 5-13). Stockholm: 
45 | P a g e  
 
The Center for Pacific Asia Studies, Department of Oriental Languages, Stockholm 
University. 
Nicholls, T. (2003). "LNG to remain dominant; million t/y of LNG or LNG equivalent." 
Petroleum Economist , 1. 
Oil & Gas Journal. (2005). "Japanese energy policy focuses on supply security." Oil & Gas 
Journal , 103:8, 32-35. 
Ouimet, M. J. (2006). "The Stalemate North of Hokkaido." SAIS Review , 26:1, 93-108. 
Petroleum Economist. (2003, March). "Russia/Japan." Petroleum Economist , p. 1. 
Ross, M. L. (2008). "Blood Barrels; Why Oil Wealth Fuels Conflict." Foreign Affairs , 87:3, 
2. 
Rozman, G. (2007). Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Rozman, G. (2007). Strategic Thinking About the Korean Nuclear Crisis; Four Parties 
Caught between North Korea and the United States. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Rozman, G., Togo, K., & Ferguson, J. P. (2006). "Overview." In G. Rozman, K. Togo, & J. P. 
Ferguson (Eds.), Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia (pp. 1-33). New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Steans, J., & Pettiford, L. (2005). Introduction to International Relations; Perspectives and 
Themes (Second Edition ed.). Essex, England: Pearson Education Limited. 
The Economist. (2007). "Asia: Abe blows Japan's trumpet, cautiously; Japan's foreign 
policy." The Economist , 383:8527, 61. 
The Economist. (2004). "Asia: North or south?; Japan and Russia." The Economist , 
372:8391, 61. 
The Economist. (2006). "Business: After Sakhalin; Russian energy." The Economist , 
381:8508, 76. 
The Economist. (2009). "Business: Raising the stakes; Energy in Japan." The Economist , 
391:8626, 65. 
Trenin, D. (2006). "Russia's Asia Policily underVladamir Purtin, 2000-5." In G. Rozman, K. 
Togo, & J. P. Ferguson (Eds.), Russian Strategic Thought toward Asia (pp. 111-135). New 
York: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN. 
Turkeltaub, A., & Bailey, S. (2007). "Sakhalin-2 deal will alter business climate, markets". 
Oil & Gas Journal , 105:3, 34-35. 
United States Energy Information Administration. (2009). Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) - International World Energy Data and Analysis Current and Historical 
46 | P a g e  
 
Data Maps Oil Production Consumption and Reserves World Regions and Country level 
information. Retrieved January 15, 2009, from EIA - Official Energy Statistics from the U.S. 
Government: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm 
Upson, S. (2006). "Showdown On The Energy Frontier; Russia‘s huge oil and gas fields test 
relations." IEEE Spectrum , 12-15. 
Vassiliouk, S. (2008). Japanese-Russian Energy Cooperation: Problems and Perspectives. 
The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan. 
Watkins, E. (2006). "A softer tone on Sakhalin-2." Oil & Gas Journal , 104:37, 28. 
Watkins, E. (2007b). "Japan voices gas concerns." Oil & Gas Journal , 105:9, 32. 
Watkins, E. (2007a). "Oil at center of nuke talks." Oil & Gas Journal , 105:7, 30. 
Wood, D. (2007). "Russia's drive for power-2: Gazprom controls gas exports to Europe, 
Asia." Oil & Gas Journal , 105:7, 18. 
 
  
47 | P a g e  
 
13 Appendix 
13.1 Comprehensive Timelines of Conflicts Including Conflict Values 
13.1.1 The East China Sea Territorial Dispute 
1970 
 Overall CV -1 
 PRC CV  -2 
 China makes claims to Senkaku Islands previously claimed by Japan (Drifte, 
2008). 
 Japanese CV +1  
 Japan agrees to joint development in principle, though the agreement is with the 
ROK and the Republic of China (Taiwan) instead of the PRC.  Japan refuses to 
issue drilling permits in the ECS so as not to offend China (Drifte, 2008).  
1974 
 Overall CV +1 
 PRC CV   0 
 The PRC objects to the Japanese agreement for joint development with the ROK 
because it does not include them (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV  +1 
 Japanese refuses to ratify the agreement for joint development with the ROK 
based on PRC objections (Drifte, 2008). 
1977 
 Overall CV -1 
 PRC CV  N/A 
 Japanese CV -1 
 Japanese ratifies the agreement for joint development with the ROK despite 
Chinese objections (Drifte, 2008). 
1978 
  Overall  0 
 PRC CV  0 
 The PRC suggests shelving the dispute for a period of 10 years (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV 0 
 Japan begins joint development with the ROK, but the PRC is left out (Drifte, 
2008). 
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1980-86 
  Overall CV 0 
 PRC CV  N/A 
 Japanese CV +2 
 Japanese/ROK exploration continues but only on the Japanese side of the median 
line so as not to anger the PRC (Drifte, 2008). 
1983 
  Overall CV 0 
 PRC CV  0 
 China discovers Pinghu oil and gas field on their side of the median line (Drifte, 
2008). 
 Japanese CV +2 
 Continued joint exploration with the ROK (Drifte, 2008). 
1984 
  Overall CV +1 
 PRC CV  +1 
 China considers joint development as a means to solve the sovereignty dispute 
(Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV +2 
 Continued joint exploration with the ROK (Drifte, 2008). 
1992 
 Overall CV -1 
 PRC CV  -1 
 China prepares for explorations of Pinghu oil and gas field (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV  N/A 
1995 
 Overall CV 0 
 PRC CV  0 
 China finds oil at Chunxiao field group (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV  N/A 
1996 
  Overall CV -2  
 PRC CV   -2 
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 China suggests joint development, then starts drilling within Japan‘s claimed EEZ 
570 meters from the median line.  The PRC also patrols the area with naval 
vessels (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV -1 
 Japan insists on resolution to sovereignty issue before any joint development can 
be undertaken (Drifte, 2008). 
1998 
 Overall CV -2 
 PRC CV  -2 
 The PRC begins full operations in disputed oil and gas field, including building 
pipelines to the Chinese mainland (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV +1 
 Japan helps finance pipelines to the Chinese mainland via the Asia Development 
Bank and the then Export-Import Bank; may have been an issue of left hand not 
knowing what the right is doing (Drifte, 2008). 
1999 
  Overall CV -2 
 PRC CV  -2 
 China conducts naval warship maneuvers in the disputed waters (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV N/A 
2000 
 Overall CV -2 
 PRC CV  -2 
 PRC continues anti-submarine maneuvers in the disputed waters (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV N/A 
2003 
  Overall CV 0 
 PRC CV  0 
 China refuses to hand over data on the Chunxiao field group to Japan (Drifte, 
2008). 
 Japanese CV 0 
 Japan asks China to hand over data on the Chunxiao field group (Drifte, 2008). 
2004 
  Overall CV -2 
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 PRC CV  -2 
 China tries to chase away Japanese the survey vessel with warships, but also 
proposes joint development (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV -2 
 Japan tries to survey areas near Chinese held oil and gas fields, refuses to discuss 
joint development until China hands over geological data on Chunxiao field group, 
and insists China stop development until a compromise is made (Drifte, 2008). 
2005 
 Overall CV -1 
 PRC CV   -1 
 The PRC makes proposals for joint development in bad faith, and announces it 
will not recognize Senkaku‘s EEZ as it is uninhabited (Drifte, 2008). 
 Japanese CV -1 
 Japan announces intention to drill and award permits in the ECS.  Furthermore 
they disagree with all proposals for joint development made by the PRC (Drifte, 
2008). 
2006 
 Overall CV +1 
 PRC CV  +1  
 China makes an offer for joint development that meets Japan‘s previous demands.  
In addition they agree to a panel of experts and a hotline to prevent incidents 
(Drifte, 2008; Lai, 2007). 
 Japanese CV 0 
 Japan refuses the Chinese offer for joint development that meets their previous 
demands, but agrees to a panel of experts and a hotline to prevent incidences.  
Also suggests joint development instead of resolving the EEZ dispute (Drifte, 
2008; Lai, 2007). 
2007 
  Overall CV -2  
 PRC CV  -2 
 China pursues continued expansion of Chunxiao group, and makes a proposal for 
joint development in bad faith that is less agreeable than their previous offer 
(Drifte, 2008). 
 Japan N/A 
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13.1.2 The Russian Far East Crude Oil and Natural Gas Projects 
1975 
 Overall CV +2 
 Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration Project Joint Agreement is 
signed by Japan and USSR (Vassiliouk, 2008). 
 Russia to PRC CV N/A 
 Russia to Japan CV +2 
 Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration Project Joint agreement is 
signed by Japan and USSR (Vassiliouk, 2008). 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV +2 
 Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration Project Joint agreement is 
signed by Japan and USSR (Vassiliouk, 2008). 
1979 
 Overall CV -2 
 Political tensions cause the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration 
Project Joint agreement to fall through (Vassiliouk, 2008). 
 Russia to PRC CV N/A 
 Russia to Japan CV -2 
 Political tensions cause the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration 
Project Joint agreement to fall through (Vassiliouk, 2008). 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV -2 
 Political tensions cause the Sakhalin Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Exploration 
Project Joint agreement to fall through (Vassiliouk, 2008). 
1996 
 Overall CV +2 
 Sakhalin I & II agreements reached between Russia and overseas partners, 
including Japanese corporations (Campaign, 2007). 
 Russia to PRC CV N/A 
 Russia to Japan CV +2 
 Sakhalin I & II agreements reached between Russia and overseas partners, 
including Japanese corporations (Campaign, 2007). 
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 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV +2 
 Sakhalin I & II agreements reached between Russia and overseas partners, 
including Japanese corporations (Campaign, 2007). 
1999 
 Overall CV +4 
 Sakhalin II Phase I oil production begins (Clark, 2004; Petroleum Economist, 
2003; Vassiliouk, 2008). 
 Russia to PRC CV N/A 
 Russia to Japan CV +4 
 Sakhalin II Phase I oil production begins (Clark, 2004; Petroleum Economist, 
2003; Vassiliouk, 2008). 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV +4 
 Sakhalin II Phase I oil production begins (Clark, 2004; Petroleum Economist, 
2003; Vassiliouk, 2008). 
2003 
 Overall CV +2 
 Continued Sakhalin II Phase I production (Clark, 2004; Petroleum Economist, 
2003; Vassiliouk, 2008).  Agreements reached between Russia and China, but 
Russian leaders near Russian President Vladimir Putin continually voice the 
necessity of taxing windfall natural resource export rents so that they would be 
invested in Russia rather than built up overseas in wealth havens of oligarchs 
(Gulick, 2007). 
 Russia to PRC CV +1 
 Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of the PRC Hu Jintao sign a 
document solidifying Russia and Chinese energy cooperation.  Russia is to be 
China‘s trusted oil and gas supplier and China is to be Russia‘s preferred 
customer; this is to be the top priority between the two countries.  Putin and Hu 
also finalize a deal between Yukos Oil Company of Russia and the Chinese 
National Petroleum Corporation agreeing to ship five billion barrels of oil to 
China from 2005 to 2030 via a yet un-built pipeline from Angarsk in to Daqing.  
Yukos owner Mikhail Kordovsky is later arrested in Russia for tax evasion, 
53 | P a g e  
 
embezzlement and fraud; this embarrasses China in light of their recent deal 
(Gulick, 2007) 
 Russia to Japan CV N/A 
 PRC CV +1 
 Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of the PRC Hu Jintao sign a 
document solidifying Russia and Chinese energy cooperation.  Russia is to be 
China‘s trusted oil and gas supplier and China is to be Russia‘s preferred 
customer; this is to be the top priority between the two countries.  Putin and Hu 
also finalize a deal between Yukos Oil Company of Russia and the Chinese 
National Petroleum Corporations agreeing to ship five billion barrels of oil to 
China from 2005 to 2030 via a yet un-built pipeline from Angarsk in to Daqing 
(Gulick, 2007). 
 Japanese CV N/A 
2004 
 Overall CV +2 
 Even in light of Russian back and forth between China and Japan for the final 
route of the East Siberian Pipeline, Sakhalin II Phase I is still producing (Clark, 
2004; Petroleum Economist, 2003; Vassiliouk, 2008), and Sakhalin II Phase II is 
approved (Clark, 2004). 
 Russia to PRC CV +1 
 Russia pledges to expand oil exports to China; 10 million tons in 2005 and 15 
million tons in 2006 (Lai, 2007).  Putin announces support for doubling rail sent 
oil to China within a year and to increase the deliveries to 300,000 barrels a day 
by 2006 (Gulick, 2007) Russia declares that it has decided on a new East Siberian 
Pipeline route from Taishet to Nakhodka, instead of Angarsk to Daqing (Gulick, 
2007). 
 Russia to Japan CV -1 
 Russia‘s foreign ministry responds to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi‘s visit of 
the disputed Kurile Islands by saying that it will not add ―a constructive element 
in bilateral Russian-Japanese relations‖ (The Economist, 2004, p. 61) Russia 
approves of Sakhalin II Phase II (Clark, 2004) Russia declares that it has decided 
on a new East Siberian Pipeline route from Taishet to Nakhodka, instead of 
Angarsk to Daqing (Gulick, 2007). 
 PRC CV +1 
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 Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao visits Moscow in pledging to invest $12 billion in 
Russia‘s infrastructure and energy sector by 2020 and announcing official support 
for Russia‘s bid to join the World Trade Organization (Lai, 2007). 
 Japanese CV -1 
 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi sails past the four disputed Kurile Islands 
without landing highlighting the dispute with Russia (The Economist, 2004). 
Japan offers soft loans of 14 billion USD for the East Siberian Pipeline‘s 
development and 2 billion USD for explorations in east Siberia initially 
demanding all oil through pipeline be sent to Japan until the loans are repaid, later 
retracting the demand (Gulick, 2007) 
2005 
 Overall CV +3 
 Sakhalin I and II are both producing, even as Russia makes and breaks deals with 
Japan and the PRC (Clark, 2004; Petroleum Economist, 2003; Vassiliouk, 2008). 
 Russia to PRC CV +2 
 Russia announces the start of the design of a branch to Daqing in China on the 
Taishet to Nakhodka design of the East Siberia Pipeline (Lai, 2007).  The rail 
supply of oil from Russia to the PRC dramatically increases and Russia 
encourages the Chinese National Petroleum Company to purchase 20 percent of 
Russian oil company Rosneft which had taken over Yukos‘ assets (Gulick, 2007).  
Russia shows the first official blueprint of the new East Siberian Pipeline route 
stopping in Skovorodino, halfway to proposed end in Nakhodka, with the 
possibility of a spur to Daqing.  Russia also casts doubts that the second half 
would be built saying it depends on oil extraction and regardless construction on 
the second half would not begin until at least 2012.  Russian President Putin 
declares that when the first half of the pipeline is complete two thirds of the oil 
transported will be sent by rail to China and one third to Nakhodka, to be shipped 
to Japan and other markets (Gulick, 2007). 
 Russia to Japan CV -1 
 Japan‘s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry‘s Agency for Natural Resources 
and Energy signs a memorandum of understanding with Russian gas giant 
Gazprom to set stage for energy cooperation (The Economist, 2006; Vassiliouk, 
2008).  Gazprom begins trying to buy controlling interests of Sakhalin II when the 
proposed cost is project to double to 20 billion USD which would delay Russian 
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returns as the investors get to subtract costs from profits used to determine 
Russian royalties until their costs are paid off.  The companies involved in 
Sakhalin II are left off the short list for developing the Shtokman gas field (Wood, 
2007).  Russia shows the first official blueprint of the new East Siberian Pipeline 
route stopping in Skovorodino, halfway to proposed end in Nakhodka, with the 
possibility of a spur to Daqing.  Russia also casts doubts that the second half 
would be built saying it depends on oil extraction and regardless construction on 
the second half would not begin until at least 2012.  Russian President Putin 
declares that when the first half of the pipeline is complete two thirds of the oil 
transported will be sent by rail to China and one third to Nakhodka, to be shipped 
to Japan and other markets (Gulick, 2007). 
 PRC CV +2 
 Chinese National Petroleum Company to purchase 20 percent of Russian oil 
company Rosneft which had taken over Yukos‘ assets (Gulick, 2007). 
 Japanese CV +1 
 Japan‘s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry‘s Agency for Natural Resources 
and Energy signs a memorandum of understanding with Russian gas giant 
Gazprom to set stage for energy cooperation (The Economist, 2006; Vassiliouk, 
2008). 
2006 
 Overall CV -2 
 Construction on the first section of the East Siberian Pipeline begins (Gulick, 
2007).  Threats and effective revocations of Sakhalin II permits make investors 
wary of other projects and threaten to inflate the price of natural gas (Campaign, 
2007; The Economist, 2006; The Economist, 2007; Turkeltaub & Bailey, 2007; 
Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2007b; Wood, 2007).  Japanese attempts to tie funding to 
other conflicts (Gulick, 2007). 
 Russia to PRC CV N/A 
 Russia to Japan CV -2 
 Russia threatens to revoke permits for Sakhalin II on the basis of environmental 
infractions (Campaign, 2007; Watkins, 2006).  Russia backtracks declaring no 
intent to revoke the permits a few weeks later (Watkins, "A softer tone on 
Sakhalin-2", 2006)  Gazprom announces it will develop the Shtokman gas field on 
its own after spending years tantalizing foreign companies (The Economist, 2006; 
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Wood, 2007).  Russian Foreign Minister Victor Khistenko assures Japanese 
Foreign Minister Taro Aso that Russian promises made to Japan regarding the 
supply of natural gas from Sakhalin II would be kept (Watkins, "Japan voices gas 
concerns", 2007b). 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV -1 
 Then Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe said the decision to revoke Sakhalin II 
permits could have an negative impact on overall Japanese-Russian relations 
(Watkins, "A softer tone on Sakhalin-2", 2006).  The companies involved in the 
Sakhalin II development project sell controlling stakes to Gazprom (The 
Economist, 2006; The Economist, 2007; Turkeltaub & Bailey, 2007; Watkins, 
2007b).  Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso asks Russian Energy Minister Victor 
Khistenko to verify that Sakhalin II gas supply promises made to Japan would still 
be kept (Watkins, 2007b).  Japan tries to makes soft loans for the East Siberian 
Pipeline contingent on solving the Kurile Island dispute (Gulick, 2007). 
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13.1.3  The Korean Nuclear Crisis 
1993 
 Overall CV  -1 
 Russian CV N/A 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV N/A 
 PDRK CV  -1 
 North Korea says they will withdraw from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 
but then reverses (CNN.com, 2004) (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004). 
 ROK CV N/A 
1994 
 Overall CV +2 
 Russian CV N/A 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV  +2 
 Japan agrees to supply the aid stipulated in the PDRK-US agreement (BBC 
NEWS, 2007; Brooke, 2004; CNN.com, 2004). 
 PDRK CV  +2 
 North Korea signs an agreement with the US to freeze and dismantle their nuclear 
program in exchange for aid to build 2 nuclear power reactors and heavy fuel aid. 
(BBC NEWS, 2007; Brooke, 2004; CNN.com, 2004) 
 ROK CV  +2 
 The ROK agrees to supply the aid stipulated in the PDRK-US agreement (BBC 
NEWS, 2007; Brooke, 2004; CNN.com, 2004). 
1998 
 Overall CV -3 
 Russian CV N/A 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV N/A 
 PDRK CV -3 
 North Korea fires a missile over Japan into the ocean to show their ability to hit 
anywhere in Japan.  They also begin the first round of talks with the US over their 
suspected underground nuclear facility (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004). 
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 ROK CV N/A 
1999 
 Overall CV +1 
 Russian CV N/A 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV N/A 
 PDRK CV +1 
 North Korea agrees to freeze missile tests in exchange for easing of US sanctions 
(BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004) 
 ROK CV N/A 
2000 
 Overall CV  -1 
 Russian CV N/A 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV N/A 
 PDRK CV -1 
 North Korea declares they will restart their nuclear program if the US doesn‘t 
compensate them for the loss of electricity caused by delays in building the 
nuclear power plants (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004). 
 ROK CV N/A 
2001 
 Overall CV -1 
 Russian CV N/A 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV N/A 
 PDRK CV -1 
 North Korea declares they might resume missile tests if the US refuses to 
normalize relations (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004). 
 ROK CV N/A 
2002 
 Overall CV -2 
 Russian CV N/A 
 PRC CV N/A 
 Japanese CV  -1 
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 Japan alts shipments of oil to PDRK for having violated the 1994 agreement to 
stop their nuclear program, Koizumi travels to Pyongyang for a summit with Kim 
Jong-Il (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PDRK CV -2 
 North Korea admits to having operated a secret nuclear program since 1994, 
removes inspectors and seals cameras in nuclear facilities, and kicks out 
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 
2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 ROK CV -2  
 South Korea halts shipments of oil to PDRK for having violated the 1994 
agreement to stop their nuclear program (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; 
Rozman, 2007). 
2003 
 Overall CV  -2 
 Russian CV  +1  
 Russian Foreign Minister Losyukov visits Pyongyang to mediate on behalf of 
Russia, and takes part in first round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 
2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PRC CV  +1  
 China hosts three-way talks in Beijing with US and PDRK, and takes part in first 
round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 
2007). 
 Japanese CV -1 
 Japan takes part in first round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 2007; 
CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PDRK CV -3 
 North Korea test fires 2 land-to-ship missiles into the Sea of Japan, withdraws 
from Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, declares they have reactivated their nuclear 
power plants, takes part in three-way talks in Beijing with US and PRC, and takes 
part in first round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; 
Rozman, 2007). 
 ROK CV +1 
 South Korea takes part in first round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 
2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
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2004 
 Overall CV +1 
  Further 6 party talks postponed indefinitely as US and PDRK blame each other 
for refusing to cooperate (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 Russian CV  +1 
 Russia takes part in second round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in little 
progress other than agreeing to meet again, and takes part in third round of six 
party talks (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PRC CV +1 
 China takes part in second round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in little 
progress other than agreeing to meet again, and takes part in third round of six 
party talks (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 Japanese CV  +1 
 Japan takes part in second round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in little 
progress other than agreeing to meet again, and takes part in third round of six 
party talks (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PDRK CV +1 
 North Korea takes part in second round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in 
little progress other than agreeing to meet again, takes part in third round of six 
party talks, refuses to attend working meeting in preparation of the fourth round of 
six party talks, and offers to freeze its nuclear program in exchange for reduced 
sanctions and removal from US list of state supporters of terrorism (BBC NEWS, 
2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 ROK CV +1 
  South Korea takes part in second round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in 
little progress other than agreeing to meet again, and takes part in third round of 
six party talks (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
2005 
 Overall CV +1 
 Russian CV  +1 
 Russia takes part in fourth round of 6 part talks in Beijing which ends in a joint 
statement (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PRC CV +1 
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  China takes part in fourth round of 6 part talks in Beijing which ends in a joint 
statement (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 Japanese CV +1 
  Japan takes part in fourth round of 6 part talks in Beijing which ends in a joint 
statement (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PDRK CV 0 
  North Korea declares that they will increase its nuclear weapons arsenal in 
response to its claims that the US is attempting to topple its regime, claims to have 
finished extracting 80,000 fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor and that it has a 
stockpile of nuclear weapons which they are increasing.  Also takes part in fourth 
round of 6 part talks in Beijing during which it says it is willing to work towards 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and ends in a joint statement, but 
releases an interpretive statement following a US release of their interpretive 
statement (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 ROK CV +1 
  South Korea takes part in fourth round of 6 part talks in Beijing which ends in a 
joint statement (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
2006 
 Overall CV -3 
 Russian CV  +1  
 Russia takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 2007; 
CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PRC CV  +1  
 China takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 2007; 
CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 Japanese CV  +1  
 Japan takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 2007; 
CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 PDRK CV -3 
  North Korea test fires 7 missiles in defiance of international warnings including a 
long-range Taepodong-2 rocket believed capable of reaching the US, leading to 
UN Security Council sanction against them, and tests a nuclear weapon leading to 
UN Security Council call for states to block supply of major weapons, hardware 
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or technology for WMDs and of luxury goods.  Also takes part in the fifth round 
of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
 ROK CV +1 
 South Korea takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing (BBC NEWS, 
2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007). 
2007 
 Overall CV +1 
 Russian CV +1 
  Russia takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in Joint 
agreement of 3 phases and 5 working groups to end the conflict, and takes part in 
first and second sessions of sixth round of 6 party talks in Beijing after working 
groups have met (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007; Watkins, 
2007a). 
 PRC CV  +1  
 China takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in Joint 
agreement of 3 phases and 5 working groups to end the conflict, and takes part in 
first and second sessions of sixth round of 6 party talks in Beijing after working 
groups have met (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007; Watkins, 
2007a). 
 Japanese CV  +1  
 Japan takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in Joint 
agreement of 3 phases and 5 working groups to end the conflict, and takes part in first 
and second sessions of sixth round of 6 party talks in Beijing after working groups 
have met (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007; Watkins, 2007a). 
 PDRK CV  +1  
 North Korea takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in 
Joint agreement of 3 phases and 5 working groups to end the conflict, and 
announces plans for second nuclear test if a financial dispute with the US is not 
resolved.  Also takes part in first and second sessions of sixth round of 6 party 
talks in Beijing after working groups have met and during which it agrees to take 
first steps toward disarmament and shut down its nuclear reactor within 60 days 
before eventually dismantling its nuclear weapons program in exchange for oil 
(BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007; Watkins, 2007a). 
 ROK CV +1 
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  South Korea takes part in fifth round of 6 party talks in Beijing which ends in 
Joint agreement of 3 phases and 5 working groups to end the conflict, and takes 
part in first and second sessions of sixth round of 6 party talks in Beijing after 
working groups have met (BBC NEWS, 2007; CNN.com, 2004; Rozman, 2007; 
Watkins, 2007a). 
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13.2 Comprehensive Tables of Crude Oil and Natural Gas Statistics 
Table 13-1—Crude Oil Prices
Year Price 
1969 10.23 
1970 9.65 
1971 11.53 
1972 12.36 
1973 15.42 
1974 48.92 
1975 44.64 
1976 46.84 
1977 47.83 
1978 44.77 
1979 90.68 
1980 93.08 
1981 82.25 
1982 71.08 
1983 61.73 
1984 56.14 
1985 53.21 
1986 27.22 
1987 33.64 
1988 26.24 
1989 30.47 
1990 37.82 
1991 30.57 
1992 28.65 
1993 24.52 
1994 22.37 
1995 23.40 
1996 27.54 
1997 24.97 
1998 16.69 
1999 22.74 
2000 34.92 
2001 29.03 
2002 29.06 
2003 32.51 
2004 42.02 
2005 57.90 
2006 67.03 
2007 72.39 
Table 13-2—Crude Oil Consumption (Thousands of Barrels/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 4480 404 3323 UA 130 8337 
1970 4940 559 3922 UA 163 9583 
1971 5245 759 4336 UA 184 10523 
1972 5675 871 4625 UA 191 11362 
1973 6119 1067 5324 UA 236 12745 
1974 6736 1226 5127 UA 244 13333 
1975 7065 1353 4840 UA 278 13535 
1976 7217 1546 5033 UA 310 14107 
1977 7538 1638 5185 UA 371 14733 
1978 7969 1825 5425 UA 426 15645 
1979 8117 1833 5487 UA 480 15917 
1980 8494 1694 4936 48.00 475 15647 
1981 8600 1616 4693 51.00 473 15434 
1982 8545 1601 4396 52.00 471 15066 
1983 8428 1642 4391 57.00 497 15016 
1984 8414 1700 4619 60.00 500 15293 
1985 8535 1825 4435 64.46 537 15397 
1986 5086 1941 4495 67.91 588 12178 
1987 5131 2062 4503 68.58 620 12385 
1988 5080 2211 4804 64.70 739 12899 
1989 5192 2340 5005 63.92 854 13456 
1990 5129 2323 5304 73.21 1038 13867 
1991 4999 2524 5411 76.48 1254 14266 
1992 4597 2740 5522 73.97 1518 14450 
1993 3875 3051 5441 71.66 1675 14114 
1994 3359 3116 5746 69.65 1840 14130 
1995 3025 3395 5784 63.15 2009 14277 
1996 2686 3702 5813 47.84 2144 14392 
1997 2689 4179 5762 40.41 2373 15043 
1998 2554 4228 5525 35.00 2030 14373 
1999 2625 4477 5618 29.99 2178 14928 
2000 2583 4772 5577 25.38 2229 15186 
2001 2566 4872 5435 22.51 2235 15130 
2002 2606 5288 5359 24.53 2282 15559 
2003 2622 5803 5455 24.52 2300 16204 
2004 2619 6772 5281 24.02 2283 16978 
2005 2601 6984 5358 18.62 2308 17270 
2006 2709 7530 5224 16.50 2318 17797 
2007 2699 7855 5051 16.000 2371 17992 
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Table 13-3—Crude Oil Consumption (Millions of USD/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 45.83 4.13 33.99 UA 1.33 85.28 
1970 47.67 5.39 37.85 UA 1.57 92.49 
1971 60.48 8.75 50.00 UA 2.12 121.34 
1972 70.15 10.77 57.17 UA 2.36 140.45 
1973 94.36 16.45 82.11 UA 3.64 196.57 
1974 329.50 59.99 250.79 UA 11.94 652.21 
1975 315.37 60.38 216.05 UA 12.39 604.20 
1976 338.07 72.43 235.74 UA 14.54 660.77 
1977 360.57 78.34 248.02 UA 17.76 704.70 
1978 356.72 81.69 242.85 UA 19.07 700.33 
1979 736.07 166.25 497.56 UA 43.55 1443.43 
1980 790.64 157.70 459.39 4.47 44.26 1456.46 
1981 707.38 132.93 386.01 4.19 38.92 1269.44 
1982 607.43 113.83 312.51 3.70 33.47 1070.94 
1983 520.28 101.38 271.08 3.52 30.65 926.91 
1984 472.33 95.41 259.29 3.37 28.08 858.47 
1985 454.13 97.09 236.00 3.43 28.58 819.23 
1986 138.42 52.84 122.35 1.85 16.00 331.46 
1987 172.61 69.37 151.49 2.31 20.87 416.64 
1988 133.31 58.03 126.08 1.70 19.38 338.50 
1989 158.22 71.32 152.51 1.95 26.04 410.03 
1990 193.98 87.84 200.61 2.77 39.28 524.48 
1991 152.82 77.16 165.42 2.34 38.34 436.07 
1992 131.70 78.50 158.21 2.12 43.50 414.03 
1993 95.01 74.81 133.41 1.76 41.07 346.06 
1994 75.15 69.72 128.56 1.56 41.17 316.16 
1995 70.79 79.43 135.35 1.48 47.00 334.06 
1996 73.98 101.96 160.10 1.32 59.06 396.42 
1997 67.14 104.33 143.84 1.01 59.25 375.57 
1998 42.62 70.56 92.21 0.58 33.88 239.85 
1999 59.69 101.79 127.74 0.68 49.52 339.42 
2000 90.19 166.63 194.72 0.89 77.82 530.25 
2001 74.50 141.44 157.78 0.65 64.89 439.26 
2002 75.72 153.66 155.72 0.71 66.32 452.13 
2003 85.24 188.65 177.34 0.80 74.78 526.81 
2004 110.02 284.54 221.88 1.01 95.92 713.37 
2005 150.62 404.36 310.22 1.08 133.61 999.88 
2006 181.57 504.75 350.16 1.11 155.37 1192.96 
2007 195.38 568.58 365.64 1.16 171.67 1302.43 
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Table 13-4—Crude Oil Production (Thousands of Barrels/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 6566.00 435.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 7001.99 
1970 7126.75 614.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 7741.43 
1971 7610.46 790.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 8400.82 
1972 8064.13 913.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 8977.53 
1973 8664.42 1075.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 9739.56 
1974 9270.41 1300.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 10570.96 
1975 9915.98 1545.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 11461.41 
1976 10465.60 1743.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 12208.80 
1977 11009.91 1877.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 12887.85 
1978 11530.75 2086.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 13617.46 
1979 11805.42 2128.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 13934.24 
1980 12116.41 2119.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14235.41 
1981 12260.25 2029.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 14290.20 
1982 12329.79 2048.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14377.78 
1983 12403.43 2127.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 14530.65 
1984 12296.68 2292.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 14588.88 
1985 10904.15 2504.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 13408.99 
1986 11305.51 2620.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 13926.48 
1987 11483.72 2690.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 14173.87 
1988 11444.04 2741.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14185.04 
1989 11134.50 2760.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 13894.85 
1990 10404.56 2773.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 13178.34 
1991 9326.30 2827.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 12153.83 
1992 8038.17 2840.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 10878.97 
1993 7172.73 2888.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 10061.22 
1994 6419.07 2929.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 9348.68 
1995 6288.24 2988.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 9276.81 
1996 6113.77 3170.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 9284.17 
1997 6226.87 3211.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 9438.24 
1998 6168.52 3212.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 9380.90 
1999 6177.86 3213.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 9391.04 
2000 6536.02 3252.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 9788.42 
2001 7056.07 3305.63 0.00 0.00 0.00 10361.71 
2002 7698.16 3346.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 11044.63 
2003 8544.18 3400.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 11945.17 
2004 9287.06 3481.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 12768.08 
2005 9552.00 3626.69 0.00 0.00 0.00 13178.69 
2006 9769.39 3683.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 13452.97 
2007 9978.02 3743.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 13721.39 
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Table 13-5—Yearly Required Imports of Crude Oil (Thousands of Barrels/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 -2086 -32 3323 UA 130 1335 
1970 -2187 -56 3922 UA 163 1841 
1971 -2366 -31 4336 UA 184 2123 
1972 -2390 -42 4625 UA 191 2384 
1973 -2546 -9 5324 UA 236 3006 
1974 -2535 -74 5127 UA 244 2762 
1975 -2851 -193 4840 UA 278 2073 
1976 -3248 -197 5033 UA 310 1898 
1977 -3472 -240 5185 UA 371 1845 
1978 -3562 -262 5425 UA 426 2027 
1979 -3688 -296 5487 UA 480 1983 
1980 -3622 -425 4936 48 475 1412 
1981 -3660 -414 4693 51 473 1143 
1982 -3784 -447 4396 52 471 688 
1983 -3975 -485 4391 57 497 485 
1984 -3883 -593 4619 60 500 704 
1985 -2369 -680 4435 64 537 1988 
1986 -6220 -680 4495 68 588 -1749 
1987 -6353 -628 4503 69 620 -1789 
1988 -6364 -530 4804 65 739 -1286 
1989 -5942 -420 5005 64 854 -439 
1990 -5276 -451 5304 73 1038 689 
1991 -4327 -303 5411 76 1254 2112 
1992 -3442 -101 5522 74 1518 3571 
1993 -3298 163 5441 72 1675 4052 
1994 -3060 186 5746 70 1840 4781 
1995 -3263 406 5784 63 2009 5000 
1996 -3428 531 5813 48 2144 5108 
1997 -3537 967 5762 40 2373 5605 
1998 -3614 1016 5525 35 2030 4992 
1999 -3553 1264 5618 30 2178 5537 
2000 -3953 1520 5577 25 2229 5397 
2001 -4490 1566 5435 23 2235 4768 
2002 -5093 1941 5359 25 2282 4514 
2003 -5922 2402 5455 25 2300 4259 
2004 -6668 3291 5281 24 2283 4210 
2005 -6951 3357 5358 19 2308 4091 
2006 -7061 3846 5224 17 2318 4344 
2007 -7279 4111 5051 16 2371 4271 
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Table 13-6—Yearly Required Imports of Crude Oil (Millions of USD/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 -21.33 -0.33 33.99 UA 1.33 13.66 
1970 -21.11 -0.54 37.85 UA 1.57 17.77 
1971 -27.28 -0.36 50.00 UA 2.12 24.48 
1972 -29.54 -0.52 57.17 UA 2.36 29.47 
1973 -39.26 -0.13 82.11 UA 3.64 46.36 
1974 -124.00 -3.64 250.79 UA 11.94 135.09 
1975 -127.29 -8.60 216.05 UA 12.39 92.55 
1976 -152.15 -9.23 235.74 UA 14.54 88.89 
1977 -166.05 -11.48 248.02 UA 17.76 88.25 
1978 -159.45 -11.72 242.85 UA 19.07 90.74 
1979 -334.47 -26.80 497.56 UA 43.55 179.84 
1980 -337.15 -39.54 459.39 4.47 44.26 131.43 
1981 -301.05 -34.04 386.01 4.19 38.92 94.04 
1982 -269.00 -31.75 312.51 3.70 33.47 48.93 
1983 -245.38 -29.93 271.08 3.52 30.65 29.94 
1984 -217.95 -33.27 259.29 3.37 28.08 39.51 
1985 -126.06 -36.18 236.00 3.43 28.58 105.77 
1986 -169.29 -18.50 122.35 1.85 16.00 -47.60 
1987 -213.71 -21.13 151.49 2.31 20.87 -60.17 
1988 -167.01 -13.90 126.08 1.70 19.38 -33.75 
1989 -181.06 -12.80 152.51 1.95 26.04 -13.37 
1990 -199.54 -17.07 200.61 2.77 39.28 26.05 
1991 -132.26 -9.28 165.42 2.34 38.34 64.55 
1992 -98.61 -2.89 158.21 2.12 43.50 102.32 
1993 -80.86 3.99 133.41 1.76 41.07 99.36 
1994 -68.48 4.17 128.56 1.56 41.17 106.98 
1995 -76.35 9.50 135.35 1.48 47.00 116.99 
1996 -94.42 14.64 160.10 1.32 59.06 140.70 
1997 -88.31 24.15 143.84 1.01 59.25 139.94 
1998 -60.32 16.95 92.21 0.58 33.88 83.31 
1999 -80.77 28.73 127.74 0.68 49.52 125.90 
2000 -138.03 53.06 194.72 0.89 77.82 188.46 
2001 -130.35 45.47 157.78 0.65 64.89 138.44 
2002 -147.99 56.41 155.72 0.71 66.32 131.18 
2003 -192.54 78.08 177.34 0.80 74.78 138.46 
2004 -280.19 138.28 221.88 1.01 95.92 176.90 
2005 -402.42 194.39 310.22 1.08 133.61 236.87 
2006 -473.30 257.82 350.16 1.11 155.37 291.16 
2007 -526.92 297.60 365.64 1.16 171.67 309.15 
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Table 13-7—Natural Gas Prices 
Year Price (USD/1000 Cubic feet) 
1969 UA 
1970 UA 
1971 UA 
1972 UA 
1973 UA 
1974 UA 
1975 UA 
1976 UA 
1977 UA 
1978 UA 
1979 UA 
1980 UA 
1981 UA 
1982 UA 
1983 UA 
1984 UA 
1985 5.23 
1986 4.10 
1987 3.35 
1988 3.34 
1989 3.28 
1990 3.64 
1991 3.99 
1992 3.62 
1993 3.52 
1994 3.18 
1995 3.46 
1996 3.66 
1997 3.91 
1998 3.05 
1999 3.14 
2000 4.72 
2001 4.64 
2002 4.27 
2003 4.77 
2004 5.18 
2005 6.05 
2006 7.14 
2007 7.73 
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Table 13-8—Natural Gas Consumption (Billions of Cubic Feet/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 16.4 0.2 0.2 0 0.0 17 
1970 18.1 0.3 0.3 0 0.0 19 
1971 19.7 0.4 0.4 0 0.0 20 
1972 20.7 0.5 0.4 0 0.0 22 
1973 22.6 0.6 0.5 0 0.0 24 
1974 23.9 0.7 0.7 0 0.0 25 
1975 26.1 0.9 0.8 0 0.0 28 
1976 28.7 1.0 1.0 0 0.0 31 
1977 30.8 1.2 1.2 0 0.0 33 
1978 32.8 1.3 1.7 0 0.0 36 
1979 34.9 1.4 2.0 0 0.0 38 
1980 35.8 1.4 2.3 0 0.0 40 
1981 38.0 1.2 2.3 0 0.0 42 
1982 41.1 1.2 2.4 0 0.0 45 
1983 44.0 1.2 2.6 0 0.0 48 
1984 47.9 1.2 3.4 0 0.0 53 
1985 34.9 1.3 3.7 0 0.0 40 
1986 35.4 1.3 3.8 0 0.1 41 
1987 37.4 1.3 3.9 0 0.2 43 
1988 39.4 1.4 4.1 0 0.3 45 
1989 40.0 1.5 4.3 0 0.3 46 
1990 40.7 1.5 4.7 0 0.3 47 
1991 41.7 1.5 4.9 0 0.4 49 
1992 40.3 1.5 5.1 0 0.5 47 
1993 40.3 1.6 5.1 0 0.6 48 
1994 37.8 1.7 5.5 0 0.8 46 
1995 36.6 1.7 5.6 0 1.0 45 
1996 36.7 1.8 6.0 0 1.3 46 
1997 33.9 1.9 6.2 0 1.6 44 
1998 35.3 2.0 6.4 0 1.5 45 
1999 35.2 2.1 6.7 0 1.8 46 
2000 36.4 2.4 7.0 0 2.0 48 
2001 36.1 2.7 7.2 0 2.2 48 
2002 37.6 2.8 7.0 0 2.5 50 
2003 38.0 3.3 7.7 0 2.6 52 
2004 38.8 3.8 7.4 0 3.0 53 
2005 39.2 4.5 7.6 0 3.3 55 
2006 41.8 5.4 8.1 0 3.4 59 
2007 42.5 6.5 8.7 0 3.6 61 
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Table 13-9—Natural Gas Consumption (Millions of USD/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1970 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1971 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1972 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1973 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1974 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1975 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1976 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1977 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1978 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1979 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1980 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1981 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1982 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1983 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1984 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1985 182.937 6.5486 19.3844 0 0 209 
1986 145.016 5.46103 15.4562 0 0.2051 166 
1987 125.264 4.50204 12.9456 0 0.75772 143 
1988 131.433 4.6278 13.6521 0 0.97326 151 
1989 131.35 4.76974 13.9641 0 0.92736 151 
1990 147.968 5.37073 16.9301 0 1.18293 171 
1991 166.409 6.13421 19.6222 0 1.50213 194 
1992 145.743 5.54668 18.4579 0 1.77787 172 
1993 141.692 5.70793 18.1218 0 2.16564 168 
1994 120.257 5.33566 17.5083 0 2.60428 146 
1995 126.473 5.93904 19.3877 0 3.42686 155 
1996 134.163 6.52897 21.822 0 4.77611 167 
1997 132.547 7.39354 24.2647 0 6.21761 170 
1998 107.633 5.97774 19.4997 0 4.53725 138 
1999 110.468 6.52994 21.0842 0 5.68753 144 
2000 171.804 11.1593 32.9222 0 9.57605 225 
2001 167.302 12.3142 33.3379 0 10.3688 223 
2002 160.667 12.0569 30.0154 0 10.6033 213 
2003 181.332 15.6489 36.8159 0 12.4064 246 
2004 200.856 19.8284 38.4892 0 15.7445 275 
2005 237.144 27.3728 45.981 0 19.7426 330 
2006 298.43 38.7746 57.8359 0 24.5601 420 
2007 328.175 50.3324 67.4839 0 27.6558 474 
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Table 13-10—Natural Gas Production (Billions of Cubic Feet/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1970 17.9 0.3 0 0 0 18 
1971 19.2 0.4 0 0 0 20 
1972 19.9 0.5 0 0 0 20 
1973 21.3 0.6 0 0 0 22 
1974 23.5 0.7 0 0 0 24 
1975 26.1 0.9 0 0 0 27 
1976 28.9 1.0 0 0 0 30 
1977 31.2 1.2 0 0 0 32 
1978 33.6 1.3 0 0 0 35 
1979 36.7 1.4 0 0 0 38 
1980 39.2 1.4 0 0 0 41 
1981 42.0 1.2 0 0 0 43 
1982 45.2 1.2 0 0 0 46 
1983 48.3 1.2 0 0 0 50 
1984 52.9 1.2 0 0 0 54 
1985 41.7 1.3 0 0 0 43 
1986 45.4 1.3 0 0 0 47 
1987 49.1 1.3 0 0 0 50 
1988 53.1 1.4 0 0 0 54 
1989 55.6 1.5 0 0 0 57 
1990 57.9 1.5 0 0 0 59 
1991 58.0 1.5 0 0 0 60 
1992 57.6 1.5 0 0 0 59 
1993 55.8 1.6 0 0 0 57 
1994 54.8 1.7 0 0 0 57 
1995 53.7 1.7 0 0 0 55 
1996 54.1 1.9 0 0 0 56 
1997 51.5 2.2 0 0 0 54 
1998 53.3 2.3 0 0 0 56 
1999 53.3 2.4 0 0 0 56 
2000 52.6 2.6 0 0 0 55 
2001 52.5 2.9 0 0 0 55 
2002 53.7 3.2 0 0 0 57 
2003 56.0 3.4 0 0 0 59 
2004 57.0 4.0 0 0 0 61 
2005 57.9 4.8 0 0 0 63 
2006 59.2 5.7 0 0 0 65 
2007 58.8 6.7 0 0 0 65 
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Table 13-11—Yearly Required Imports of Natural Gas (Billions of Cubic Feet/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1970 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 1 
1971 0.6 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 1 
1972 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 1 
1973 1.2 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 2 
1974 0.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 1 
1975 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 1 
1976 -0.2 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 1 
1977 -0.4 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 1 
1978 -0.8 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.0 1 
1979 -1.8 0.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0 
1980 -3.3 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 -1 
1981 -3.9 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 -2 
1982 -4.1 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 -2 
1983 -4.3 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 -2 
1984 -4.9 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 -2 
1985 -6.8 0.0 3.7 0.0 0.0 -3 
1986 -10.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 0.1 -6 
1987 -11.7 0.0 3.9 0.0 0.2 -8 
1988 -13.7 0.0 4.1 0.0 0.3 -9 
1989 -15.5 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.3 -11 
1990 -17.2 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.3 -12 
1991 -16.3 0.0 4.9 0.0 0.4 -11 
1992 -17.4 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.5 -12 
1993 -15.5 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.6 -10 
1994 -17.0 0.0 5.5 0.0 0.8 -11 
1995 -17.2 0.0 5.6 0.0 1.0 -11 
1996 -17.5 -0.2 6.0 0.0 1.3 -10 
1997 -17.6 -0.3 6.2 0.0 1.6 -10 
1998 -18.1 -0.3 6.4 0.0 1.5 -10 
1999 -18.1 -0.4 6.7 0.0 1.8 -10 
2000 -16.2 -0.3 7.0 0.0 2.0 -7 
2001 -16.4 -0.3 7.2 0.0 2.2 -7 
2002 -16.1 -0.3 7.0 0.0 2.5 -7 
2003 -18.0 -0.1 7.7 0.0 2.6 -8 
2004 -18.2 -0.2 7.4 0.0 3.0 -8 
2005 -18.7 -0.2 7.6 0.0 3.3 -8 
2006 -17.4 -0.2 8.1 0.0 3.4 -6 
2007 -16.3 -0.2 8.7 0.0 3.6 -4 
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Table 13-12—Yearly Required Imports of Natural Gas (Millions of USD/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1970 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1971 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1972 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1973 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1974 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1975 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1976 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1977 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1978 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1979 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1980 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1981 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1982 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1983 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1984 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1985 -35.3 0.0 19.4 0.0 0.0 -16 
1986 -41.2 0.0 15.5 0.0 0.2 -26 
1987 -39.3 0.0 12.9 0.0 0.8 -26 
1988 -45.9 0.0 13.7 0.0 1.0 -31 
1989 -50.9 0.0 14.0 0.0 0.9 -36 
1990 -62.6 0.0 16.9 0.0 1.2 -45 
1991 -65.1 0.2 19.6 0.0 1.5 -44 
1992 -62.9 0.0 18.5 0.0 1.8 -43 
1993 -54.6 0.0 18.1 0.0 2.2 -34 
1994 -54.0 -0.1 17.5 0.0 2.6 -34 
1995 -59.5 -0.1 19.4 0.0 3.4 -37 
1996 -64.0 -0.6 21.8 0.0 4.8 -38 
1997 -68.9 -1.2 24.3 0.0 6.2 -40 
1998 -55.1 -0.9 19.5 0.0 4.5 -32 
1999 -56.9 -1.1 21.1 0.0 5.7 -31 
2000 -76.4 -1.2 32.9 0.0 9.6 -35 
2001 -76.2 -1.3 33.3 0.0 10.4 -34 
2002 -68.8 -1.4 30.0 0.0 10.6 -30 
2003 -85.7 -0.5 36.8 0.0 12.4 -37 
2004 -94.5 -0.9 38.5 0.0 15.7 -41 
2005 -112.9 -1.5 46.0 0.0 19.7 -49 
2006 -124.3 -1.7 57.8 0.0 24.6 -44 
2007 -126.1 -1.5 67.5 0.0 27.7 -32 
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Table 13-13—Yearly Consumption of Oil and Gas Combined (Millions of USD/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1970 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1971 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1972 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1973 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1974 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1975 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1976 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1977 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1978 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1979 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1980 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1981 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1982 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1983 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1984 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1985 637.1 103.6 255.4 3.4 28.6 1028.1 
1986 283.4 58.3 137.8 1.8 16.2 497.6 
1987 297.9 73.9 164.4 2.3 21.6 560.1 
1988 264.7 62.7 139.7 1.7 20.4 489.2 
1989 289.6 76.1 166.5 1.9 27.0 561.0 
1990 341.9 93.2 217.5 2.8 40.5 695.9 
1991 319.2 83.3 185.0 2.3 39.8 629.7 
1992 277.4 84.1 176.7 2.1 45.3 585.6 
1993 236.7 80.5 151.5 1.8 43.2 513.7 
1994 195.4 75.1 146.1 1.6 43.8 461.9 
1995 197.3 85.4 154.7 1.5 50.4 489.3 
1996 208.1 108.5 181.9 1.3 63.8 563.7 
1997 199.7 111.7 168.1 1.0 65.5 546.0 
1998 150.3 76.5 111.7 0.6 38.4 377.5 
1999 170.2 108.3 148.8 0.7 55.2 483.2 
2000 262.0 177.8 227.6 0.9 87.4 755.7 
2001 241.8 153.8 191.1 0.7 75.3 662.6 
2002 236.4 165.7 185.7 0.7 76.9 665.5 
2003 266.6 204.3 214.2 0.8 87.2 773.0 
2004 310.9 304.4 260.4 1.0 111.7 988.3 
2005 387.8 431.7 356.2 1.1 153.3 1330.1 
2006 480.0 543.5 408.0 1.1 179.9 1612.6 
2007 523.6 618.9 433.1 1.2 199.3 1776.1 
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Table 13-14—Yealy Required Import of Oil and Gas Combined (Millions of USD/Day) 
Year Russia PRC Japan DPRK ROK NEA 
1969 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1970 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1971 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1972 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1973 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1974 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1975 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1976 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1977 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1978 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1979 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1980 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1981 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1982 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1983 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1984 UA UA UA UA UA UA 
1985 -161.4 -36.2 255.4 3.4 28.6 89.8 
1986 -210.5 -18.5 137.8 1.8 16.2 -73.1 
1987 -253.0 -21.1 164.4 2.3 21.6 -85.8 
1988 -212.9 -13.9 139.7 1.7 20.4 -65.0 
1989 -232.0 -12.8 166.5 1.9 27.0 -49.4 
1990 -262.2 -17.1 217.5 2.8 40.5 -18.5 
1991 -197.4 -9.1 185.0 2.3 39.8 20.7 
1992 -161.5 -2.9 176.7 2.1 45.3 59.7 
1993 -135.5 4.0 151.5 1.8 43.2 65.0 
1994 -122.5 4.1 146.1 1.6 43.8 73.0 
1995 -135.8 9.4 154.7 1.5 50.4 80.3 
1996 -158.4 14.1 181.9 1.3 63.8 102.7 
1997 -157.2 23.0 168.1 1.0 65.5 100.3 
1998 -115.4 16.1 111.7 0.6 38.4 51.4 
1999 -137.7 27.6 148.8 0.7 55.2 94.6 
2000 -214.4 51.8 227.6 0.9 87.4 153.3 
2001 -206.6 44.2 191.1 0.7 75.3 104.6 
2002 -216.8 55.0 185.7 0.7 76.9 101.6 
2003 -278.3 77.6 214.2 0.8 87.2 101.5 
2004 -374.7 137.4 260.4 1.0 111.7 135.7 
2005 -515.3 192.9 356.2 1.1 153.3 188.2 
2006 -597.6 256.2 408.0 1.1 179.9 247.6 
2007 -653.0 296.1 433.1 1.2 199.3 276.7 
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Table 13-15—ECS Conflict to Oil and Natural Gas Correlations 
Year PRC CV Japanese CV Overall CV 
1969 
   
1970 -2 1 -1 
1971 
   
1972 
   
1973 
   
1974 0 1 1 
1975 
   
1976 
   
1977 
 
-1 -1 
1978 0 0 0 
1979 
   
1980 
 
2 0 
1981 
 
2 0 
1982 
 
2 0 
1983 0 2 0 
1984 1 2 1 
1985 
 
2 0 
1986 
 
2 0 
1987 
   
1988 
   
1989 
   
1990 
   
1991 
   
1992 -1 
 
-1 
1993 
   
1994 
   
1995 0 
 
0 
1996 -2 -1 -2 
1997 
   
1998 -2 0 -2 
1999 -2 
 
-2 
2000 -2 
 
-2 
2001 
   
2002 
   
2003 0 0 0 
2004 -2 -2 -2 
2005 -1 -1 -1 
2006 1 0 1 
2007 -2 
 
-2 
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Correlation Coefficient 
PRC CV to Oil Prices 0.46 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.15 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 0.43 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) -0.15 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 0.43 
PRC CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.20 
PRC CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) 0.02 
PRC CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) -0.20 
PRC CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) -0.10 
PRC CV to Gas Prices 0.26 
PRC CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.25 
PRC CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) 0.22 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) -0.25 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) 0.22 
PRC CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.07 
PRC CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 0.21 
PRC CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 0.50 
PRC CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.08 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.26 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.26 
PRC CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.23 
PRC CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.22 
Japanese CV to Oil Prices 0.38 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.75 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 0.23 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) -0.75 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 0.23 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.67 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) -0.43 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) -0.70 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) -0.63 
Japanese CV to Gas Prices -0.11 
Japanese CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.54 
Japanese CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) -0.50 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) -0.54 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) -0.50 
Japanese CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.58 
Japanese CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) -0.41 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 0.66 
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Correlation Coefficient 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.63 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.27 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.27 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.46 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.56 
Overall CV to Oil Prices 0.40 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.40 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 0.35 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) -0.40 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 0.35 
Overall CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.40 
Overall CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) -0.13 
Overall CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) -0.37 
Overall CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) -0.26 
Overall CV to Gas Prices 0.23 
Overall CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.25 
Overall CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) 0.03 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) -0.46 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) 0.03 
Overall CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.07 
Overall CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 0.06 
Overall CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 0.62 
Overall CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.29 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.16 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.16 
Overall CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.06 
Overall CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.00 
Japanese CV to PRC CV 0.55 
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Table 13-16—Sakhalin I, II and Siberian Pipeline Conflicts to Oil and Natural Gas 
Correlations 
Year Russia to PRC CV Russia to Japan CV PRC CV Japanese CV Overall CV 
1975 
 
2 
 
2 2 
1876 
 
-2 
 
-2 -2 
1977 
     
1978 
     
1979 
     
1980 
     
1981 
     
1982 
     
1983 
     
1984 
     
1985 
     
1986 
     
1987 
     
1988 
     
1989 
     
1990 
     
1991 
     
1992 
     
1993 
     
1994 
     
1995 
     
1996 
 
2 
 
2 2 
1997 
     
1998 
     
1999 
 
4 
 
4 4 
2000 
     
2001 
     
2002 
     
2003 1 
 
1 
 
2 
2004 1 -1 1 -1 2 
2005 2 -1 2 1 3 
2006 
 
-2 
 
-1 -2 
2007      
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Correlation Coefficient 
Russia to PRC CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Value) -0.94 
Russia to PRC CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.92 
Russia to PRC CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
0.92 
Russia to Japan CV to Oil Prices -0.82 
Russia to Japan CV to Gas Prices -0.94 
Russia to Japan CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.09 
Russia to Japan CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) -0.40 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) 0.62 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) 0.73 
Russia to Japan CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.28 
Russia to Japan CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) -0.93 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) -0.08 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) 0.95 
Russia to Japan CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.93 
Russia to Japan CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
0.93 
Russia to Japan CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.36 
Russia to Japan CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) -0.61 
Russia to Japan CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) -0.47 
Russia to Japan CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) -0.57 
Russia to Japan CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.51 
Russia to Japan CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) -0.90 
Russia to Japan CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) -0.28 
Russia to Japan CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.53 
Russia to Japan CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.91 
Russia to Japan CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.91 
Russia to Japan CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.43 
Russia to Japan CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) -0.82 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 0.43 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) -0.82 
Russia to Japan CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.08 
Russia to Japan CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) -0.92 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) -0.08 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) -0.92 
Russia to Japan CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.91 
Russia to Japan CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
-0.91 
Russia to Japan CV to Total NEA Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.56 
Russia to Japan CV to Total NEA Oil Consumption (Value) -0.80 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Total NEA Oil Imports (Volume) 0.40 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Total NEA Oil Imports (Value) -0.50 
83 | P a g e  
 
Correlation Coefficient 
Russia to Japan CV to Total NEA Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.09 
Russia to Japan CV to Total NEA Gas Consumption (Value) -0.81 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Volume) -0.42 
Russia to Japan CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Value) 0.69 
Russia to Japan CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Consumption 
(Value) 
-0.77 
Russia to Japan CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
-0.70 
PRC CV to Oil Prices 0.93 
PRC CV to Gas Prices 0.95 
PRC CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.99 
PRC CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) 0.93 
PRC CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) -0.71 
PRC CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) -0.91 
PRC CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.77 
PRC CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) 0.94 
PRC CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) -0.92 
PRC CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) -0.95 
PRC CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.93 
PRC CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.91 
PRC CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.64 
PRC CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) 0.90 
PRC CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) 0.55 
PRC CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) 0.86 
PRC CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.90 
PRC CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 0.94 
PRC CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) -0.88 
PRC CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) -0.92 
PRC CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.90 
PRC CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.86 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.06 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 0.94 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) -0.06 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 0.94 
PRC CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.10 
PRC CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) 0.99 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) 0.10 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) 0.99 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.95 
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Correlation Coefficient 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.95 
PRC CV to Total NEA Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.71 
PRC CV to Total NEA Oil Consumption (Value) 0.92 
PRC CV to Required Total NEA Oil Imports (Volume) -0.96 
PRC CV to Required Total NEA Oil Imports (Value) 0.92 
PRC CV to Total NEA Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.87 
PRC CV to Total NEA Gas Consumption (Value) 0.94 
PRC CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Volume) -0.75 
PRC CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Value) -0.94 
PRC CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.92 
PRC CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.92 
Japanese CV to Oil Prices -0.65 
Japanese CV to Gas Prices -0.82 
Japanese CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.24 
Japanese CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) -0.47 
Japanese CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) 0.42 
Japanese CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) 0.51 
Japanese CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.11 
Japanese CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) -0.82 
Japanese CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) -0.23 
Japanese CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) 0.81 
Japanese CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.80 
Japanese CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.78 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.17 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) -0.39 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) -0.27 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) -0.36 
Japanese CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.30 
Japanese CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) -0.77 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) -0.45 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.31 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.77 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.78 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.48 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) -0.63 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 0.05 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) -0.63 
Japanese CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.09 
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Correlation Coefficient 
Japanese CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) -0.80 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) 0.09 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) -0.80 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.75 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.75 
Japanese CV to Total NEA Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.36 
Japanese CV to Total NEA Oil Consumption (Value) -0.60 
Japanese CV to Required Total NEA Oil Imports (Volume) 0.49 
Japanese CV to Required Total NEA Oil Imports (Value) -0.27 
Japanese CV to Total NEA Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.09 
Japanese CV to Total NEA Gas Consumption (Value) -0.81 
Japanese CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Volume) -0.42 
Japanese CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Value) 0.69 
Japanese CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.77 
Japanese CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.70 
Overall CV to Oil Prices -0.60 
Overall CV to Gas Prices -0.74 
Overall CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.41 
Overall CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) -0.59 
Overall CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) 0.08 
Overall CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) 0.36 
Overall CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.07 
Overall CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) -0.77 
Overall CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) -0.41 
Overall CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) 0.67 
Overall CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.75 
Overall CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.66 
Overall CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.09 
Overall CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) -0.24 
Overall CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) 0.01 
Overall CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) -0.20 
Overall CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.10 
Overall CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) -0.75 
Overall CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) -0.44 
Overall CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.39 
Overall CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.69 
Overall CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.68 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.46 
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Correlation Coefficient 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) -0.57 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 0.46 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) -0.57 
Overall CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.28 
Overall CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) -0.74 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) 0.28 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) -0.74 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.69 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.69 
Overall CV to Total NEA Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.09 
Overall CV to Total NEA Oil Consumption (Value) -0.52 
Overall CV to Required Total NEA Oil Imports (Volume) 0.49 
Overall CV to Required Total NEA Oil Imports (Value) -0.21 
Overall CV to Total NEA Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.11 
Overall CV to Total NEA Gas Consumption (Value) -0.76 
Overall CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Volume) -0.54 
Overall CV to Required Total NEA Gas Imports (Value) 0.38 
Overall CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.71 
Overall CV to Total NEA Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.75 
Overall CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.35 
Overall CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Value) -0.57 
Overall CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Volume) 0.35 
Overall CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Value) -0.09 
Overall CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.13 
Overall CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Value) -0.67 
Overall CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Volume) 0.13 
Overall CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Value) -0.67 
Overall CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) -0.68 
Overall CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.68 
 
  
87 | P a g e  
 
Table 13-17—Korean Nuclear Crisis to Oil and Natural Gas Correlations 
Year Russian CV PRC CV Japanese CV DPRK CV ROK CV Overall CV 
1993 
   
-1 
 
-1 
1994 
  
2 2 2 2 
1995 
      
1996 
      
1997 
      
1998 
   
-3 
 
-3 
1999 
   
1 
 
1 
2000 
   
-1 
 
-1 
2001 
   
-1 
 
-1 
2002 
  
-1 -2 -2 -2 
2003 1 1 1 -3 1 -2 
2004 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2005 1 1 1 0 1 1 
2006 1 1 1 -3 1 -3 
2007 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Correlation Coefficient 
Russian CV to Oil Prices 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Gas Prices 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
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Correlation Coefficient 
 
Russian CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
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Correlation Coefficient 
Russian CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Russian CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Oil Prices 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Gas Prices 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
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Correlation Coefficient 
PRC CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
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Correlation Coefficient 
PRC CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
PRC CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Japanese CV to Oil Prices 0.10 
Japanese CV to Gas Prices 0.01 
Japanese CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.60 
Japanese CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) 0.18 
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Correlation Coefficient 
Japanese CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) 0.14 
Japanese CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) -0.08 
Japanese CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.18 
Japanese CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) 0.04 
Japanese CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) -0.41 
Japanese CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) -0.08 
Japanese CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.10 
Japanese CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
-0.08 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.14 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) 0.07 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) -0.13 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) 0.06 
Japanese CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.00 
Japanese CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 0.06 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 0.84 
Japanese CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.53 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.07 
Japanese CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.07 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.33 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 0.12 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 0.33 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 0.12 
Japanese CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.20 
Japanese CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) -0.01 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) -0.20 
Japanese CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) -0.01 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.10 
Japanese CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
0.10 
Japanese CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.47 
Japanese CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Value) 0.80 
Japanese CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Volume) 0.47 
Japanese CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Value) 0.80 
Japanese CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Japanese CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Japanese CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
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Correlation Coefficient 
Japanese CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Japanese CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.80 
Japanese CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.80 
Japanese CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.49 
Japanese CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Value) 0.05 
Japanese CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Volume) -0.49 
Japanese CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Value) 0.05 
Japanese CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.28 
Japanese CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Value) -0.05 
Japanese CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Volume) -0.28 
Japanese CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Value) -0.05 
Japanese CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.04 
Japanese CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.04 
DPRK CV to Oil Prices 0.07 
DPRK CV to Gas Prices -0.03 
DPRK CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.23 
DPRK CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) 0.11 
DPRK CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) 0.08 
DPRK CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) -0.04 
DPRK CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.06 
DPRK CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) -0.01 
DPRK CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) -0.03 
DPRK CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) 0.03 
DPRK CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.04 
DPRK CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.03 
DPRK CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.07 
DPRK CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) 0.05 
DPRK CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) -0.05 
DPRK CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) 0.04 
DPRK CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.02 
DPRK CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 0.04 
DPRK CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 0.21 
DPRK CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.17 
DPRK CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.05 
DPRK CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.04 
DPRK CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.13 
DPRK CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 0.07 
DPRK CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 0.13 
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Correlation Coefficient 
DPRK CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 0.07 
DPRK CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.14 
DPRK CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) -0.03 
DPRK CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) -0.14 
DPRK CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) -0.03 
DPRK CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.06 
DPRK CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.06 
DPRK CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.26 
DPRK CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Value) 0.39 
DPRK CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Volume) 0.26 
DPRK CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Value) 0.39 
DPRK CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
DPRK CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
DPRK CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
DPRK CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
DPRK CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.39 
DPRK CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.39 
DPRK CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.14 
DPRK CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Value) 0.05 
DPRK CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Volume) -0.14 
DPRK CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Value) 0.05 
DPRK CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.10 
DPRK CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Value) -0.03 
DPRK CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Volume) -0.10 
DPRK CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Value) -0.03 
DPRK CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.04 
DPRK CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.04 
ROK CV to Oil Prices 0.19 
ROK CV to Gas Prices 0.11 
ROK CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.50 
ROK CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) 0.26 
ROK CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) 0.02 
ROK CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) -0.17 
ROK CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.25 
ROK CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) 0.13 
ROK CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) -0.47 
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Correlation Coefficient 
ROK CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) -0.18 
ROK CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.18 
ROK CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.17 
ROK CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.03 
ROK CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) 0.16 
ROK CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) -0.02 
ROK CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) 0.16 
ROK CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.10 
ROK CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 0.15 
ROK CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 0.80 
ROK CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.46 
ROK CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.16 
ROK CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.16 
ROK CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.23 
ROK CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 0.21 
ROK CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 0.23 
ROK CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 0.21 
ROK CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.09 
ROK CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) 0.09 
ROK CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) -0.09 
ROK CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) 0.09 
ROK CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.19 
ROK CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.19 
ROK CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.36 
ROK CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Value) 0.75 
ROK CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Volume) 0.36 
ROK CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Value) 0.75 
ROK CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
ROK CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
ROK CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
ROK CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
ROK CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.75 
ROK CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.75 
ROK CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.38 
ROK CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Value) 0.14 
ROK CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Volume) -0.38 
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Correlation Coefficient 
ROK CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Value) 0.14 
ROK CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.16 
ROK CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Value) 0.05 
ROK CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Volume) -0.16 
ROK CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Value) 0.05 
ROK CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.13 
ROK CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.13 
Overall CV to Oil Prices 0.11 
Overall CV to Gas Prices 0.01 
Overall CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.19 
Overall CV to Russian Oil Consumption (Value) 0.14 
Overall CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Volume) -0.01 
Overall CV to Required Russian Oil Imports (Value) -0.10 
Overall CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.08 
Overall CV to Russian Gas Consumption (Value) 0.02 
Overall CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Volume) -0.14 
Overall CV to Required Russian Gas Imports (Value) -0.04 
Overall CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.07 
Overall CV to Russian Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) -0.09 
Overall CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.00 
Overall CV to PRC Oil Consumption (Value) 0.09 
Overall CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Volume) 0.01 
Overall CV to Required PRC Oil Imports (Value) 0.08 
Overall CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Volume) 0.06 
Overall CV to PRC Gas Consumption (Value) 0.07 
Overall CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Volume) 0.24 
Overall CV to Required PRC Gas Imports (Value) 0.18 
Overall CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.09 
Overall CV to PRC Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.08 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.12 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil Consumption (Value) 0.12 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Volume) 0.12 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Oil Imports (Value) 0.12 
Overall CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.08 
Overall CV to Japanese Gas Consumption (Value) 0.01 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Volume) -0.08 
Overall CV to Required Japanese Gas Imports (Value) 0.01 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.11 
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Correlation Coefficient 
Overall CV to Japanese Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports 
(Value) 
0.11 
Overall CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Volume) 0.21 
Overall CV to DPRK Oil Consumption (Value) 0.38 
Overall CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Volume) 0.21 
Overall CV to Required DPRK Oil Imports (Value) 0.38 
Overall CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Overall CV to DPRK Gas Consumption (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Overall CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Volume) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Overall CV to Required DPRK Gas Imports (Value) 
No Value (Flat 
Line) 
Overall CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.38 
Overall CV to DPRK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.38 
Overall CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Volume) -0.08 
Overall CV to ROK Oil Consumption (Value) 0.12 
Overall CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Volume) -0.08 
Overall CV to Required ROK Oil Imports (Value) 0.10 
Overall CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Volume) -0.03 
Overall CV to ROK Gas Consumption (Value) 0.02 
Overall CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Volume) -0.03 
Overall CV to Required ROK Gas Imports (Value) 0.02 
Overall CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Consumption (Value) 0.09 
Overall CV to ROK Oil and Gas Combined Required Imports (Value) 0.09 
 
